ppb_MS_microseq() discards the return values of its recursive self-calls β a mode-transfer loop that aborts on error is skipped and the whole MS_OP_PUT/GET reports success (initxfer's MS_RET(0) zeroes the error channel first)
Summary
The recursive calls' return values are thrown away and only the *ret side-channel (MS_RET) is observed - which the initxfer run actively zeroes before the transfer loop executes: any abort inside xfer->loop (adapter failure, C_CALL timeout hook like vpio's nibble timeout, or the DF-5574 guard) propagates nowhere and vpo/imm see a completed transfer over stale buffer contents. Found empirically while validating the DF-5574 fix (the guard's EINVAL vanished, rc=0). Capture-and-fold fix validated (rc=5 propagated, ret untouched).
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-5577 Β· 11 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| README.md | β | 2.6 KB | β raw | |
| VERDICT.md | β | 4.3 KB | β raw | |
| msqhx.c | β | 19.3 KB | view raw | |
| Makefile | β | 311 B | β download | |
| build.sh | β | 126 B | view raw | |
| run.sh | β | 175 B | view raw | |
| build.log | β | 7.7 KB | view raw | |
| run.log | β | 166 B | view raw | |
| fix_run.log | β | 263 B | view raw | |
| fix.diff | β | 3.2 KB | view raw | |
| env.txt | β | 670 B | view raw |
DF-5577 β ppb_MS_microseq() discards the return value of its recursive self-calls: a mode-transfer loop that aborts on error is skipped and the whole MS_OP_PUT/GET reports success (error channel zeroed by initxfer's MS_RET(0))
Severity: Low Β· Confidence: certain Β· File: sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c (pass 2)
Reproduce
sh build.shβ compiles the verbatim productionppb_msq.cintomsqhx.kosh run.shβ case 6 (non-fatal)- Observe dmesg (
dmesg | grep MSQHX) / the serial console.
Expected
BASELINE (unfixed): 'DF-5577 hook_failed=1 (rc=0 ret=0x0): FAILURE SWALLOWED - reported success (bug)' β the loop aborted on the hook's error 5, yet the top-level reports success and even executes the following MS_RET (ret overwritten to 0). PATCHED: 'DF-5577 hook_failed=1 (rc=5 ret=0x77): failure propagated (fixed)'.
Harness (shared by DF-5573..DF-5577)
msqhx.c + Makefile compile the verbatim production
/usr/src/sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c (sha256 223e7f9184c81ab83f49228ae7d1f99a
6e3936b9a452b01c6bb6176b150dda67, identical to the repo sys/ copy) into a
KLD, together with a fake ppbus controller on nexus whose
ppbus_exec_microseq method implements the exact dispatch semantics of
ppc_exec_microseq() (sys/dev/misc/ppc/ppc.c:1332-1542) for the exercised
opcodes. The interpreter target device's softc is a real struct ppb_data
and its child's ivars are a real struct ppb_device, so mode2xfer(),
ppb_MS_init(), ppb_MS_exec(), ppb_MS_microseq(), ppb_MS_loop() and
ppb_MS_init_msq() all run their production code paths. Evidence class:
"KLD-harness-with-production-code" (no parallel port in the QEMU rig) β
family standard, cf. DF-5418.
Build
# inside the guest, from this directory sh build.sh # -> /tmp/msqhx-build/msqhx.ko
Run
sh run.sh # runs this pack's case via sysctl hw.msqhx_case sh run.sh <case> # 0=suite(5575+5573) 2=5574 4=5576a 5=5576b 6=5577
Cases 2/4/5 PANIC the guest on unfixed production code (that is the finding);
the panics land on the serial console (dfbsd-qemu/vm.sh log).
Fix validation
fix.diff (sha256 8e3dfc90e6049ce1704c3cef833cba0904b6404f11360bdd299e37980e9327bb) patches sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c +
sys/bus/ppbus/ppbconf.h (all five findings; never applied to the repo's
read-only sys/ tree). Validation procedure: copy the fixed files into the
guest's /usr/src/sys/bus/ppbus/, sh build.sh again (recompiles the
production source), re-run the same case. Baseline vs patched outputs are
in run.log / fix_run.log (plus panic*.txt / fix_run.log for the
fatal cases).
DF-5577 β verdict narrative
Finding
ppb_MS_microseq() discards the return value of its recursive self-calls: a mode-transfer loop that aborts on error is skipped and the whole MS_OP_PUT/GET reports success (error channel zeroed by initxfer's MS_RET(0))
Bottom line (status: reproduced, impact: none)
Reproduced on the QEMU guest (DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT x86_64), discovered during DF-5574 fix validation when the guard's EINVAL vanished. At ppb_msq.c:301 and :309 the two recursive ppb_MS_microseq() calls have their return values discarded; the caller checks only its local error, which is the *ret side-channel written by MS_RET β and the initxfer run at :301 ends with MS_RET(0), zeroing error immediately before the transfer loop executes. Any abort inside the mode transfer loop (adapter exec_microseq failure β e.g. vpio's nibble_inbyte_hook timeout, an MS_OP_C_CALL error β or the DF-5574 guard) therefore propagates nowhere: the aborted transfer is skipped and the sequence continues to the next instruction, reporting success (harness: hook returns 5, top-level rc=0 and the following MS_RET overwrites ret with 0). For vpo/imm this means a timed-out or failed ZIP read/write mid-transfer is presented to the SCSI layer as a completed transfer over stale buffer contents β a silent data-integrity failure, not memory corruption. The top-level ppb_MS_exec() does propagate its own return value, which is why single-opcode failures surface but loop failures do not. Fix validated: capturing the recursive return value (xerr) and folding in the side-channel makes the same case return rc=5 with ret untouched (0x77) β 'failure propagated (fixed)' β and is the same change that makes the DF-5574 guard observable (rc=22).
Exploit chain
root-gated ppbus device (vpo/imm) mid-transfer timeout -> error discarded at ppb_msq.c:309 -> vpio_instr() returns success -> SCSI/CAM consumes stale buffer data as a completed transfer (silent data corruption at the I/O layer)
Evidence
run.log ('DF-5577 hook_failed=1 (rc=0 ret=0x0): FAILURE SWALLOWED - reported success (bug)') on pristine production code; fix_run.log ('DF-5577 hook_failed=1 (rc=5 ret=0x77): failure propagated (fixed)') on the fix.diff-patched source; the DF-5574 pack's v1-fix run ('rc=0' despite the guard tripping) documents the discovery
Kernel references
sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c:301sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c:303sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c:309sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c:311sys/bus/ppbus/ppb_msq.c:317sys/dev/disk/vpo/vpoio.c:469
Fix validation (fixed)
Return values of the recursive ppb_MS_microseq() calls are captured (xerr) and folded with the *ret side-channel: the failing-loop case returns rc=5 (hook's error) instead of 0, and ret remains unwritten (0x77), proving the following MS_RET no longer runs after an aborted transfer.
fix.diff (sha256 8e3dfc90e6049ce1704c3cef833cba0904b6404f11360bdd299e37980e9327bb) carries all five ppb_msq.c fixes for this pass;
the hunks relevant to this finding are marked with its DF id in the comments.
Fix validation followed the family standard (cf. DF-5418): the fixed sources
were installed into the guest's /usr/src/sys/bus/ppbus/, the harness was
rebuilt (recompiling the production file), and the exact same case was
re-run β baseline vs patched outputs are in run.log / fix_run.log
(+ panic*.txt). The repo's sys/ tree was never modified; the guest was
vm.sh reset with-src afterwards (sources restored+verified by snapshot).
PoC changes vs seed
Found while validating the DF-5574 fix: the guard's EINVAL was swallowed (rc printed 0), which pinpointed the discarded return values at ppb_msq.c:301/:309. Case 6 added to demonstrate the pristine-code swallow directly (failing MS_C_CALL hook inside a registered loop).
Guest: DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64 Harness sha256: 4b728315b40157934f62c99e847f386b30202eef77083dc1a5c065b7b0448ded
Fix status (batch validation)
Applied with the 36 sibling fix.diffs of this batch in findings/poc/_batch41/all_fixes.patch; single in-guest make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC completed RC=0 with zero errors under -Werror (full log: findings/poc/_batch41/fix_build8.log). Behavior A/B intentionally skipped for this Info-tier item.
Fix verification
fixedReturn values of the recursive ppb_MS_microseq() calls are captured (xerr) and folded with the *ret side-channel: the failing-loop case returns rc=5 (hook's error) instead of 0, and ret remains unwritten (0x77), proving the following MS_RET no longer runs after an aborted transfer.
fix_run.log (patched production source, same case); run.log (baseline) vs fix_run.log (patched); fix.diff sha256 8e3dfc90e6049ce1704c3cef833cba0904b6404f11360bdd299e37980e9327bb
Confirmed kernel references
Detail
Exploit chain
root-gated ppbus device (vpo/imm) mid-transfer timeout -> error discarded at ppb_msq.c:309 -> vpio_instr() returns success -> SCSI/CAM consumes stale buffer data as a completed transfer (silent data corruption at the I/O layer)
Evidence (decisive lines)
run.log ('DF-5577 hook_failed=1 (rc=0 ret=0x0): FAILURE SWALLOWED - reported success (bug)') on pristine production code; fix_run.log ('DF-5577 hook_failed=1 (rc=5 ret=0x77): failure propagated (fixed)') on the fix.diff-patched source; the DF-5574 pack's v1-fix run ('rc=0' despite the guard tripping) documents the discovery
PoC changes
Found while validating the DF-5574 fix: the guard's EINVAL was swallowed (rc printed 0), which pinpointed the discarded return values at ppb_msq.c:301/:309. Case 6 added to demonstrate the pristine-code swallow directly (failing MS_C_CALL hook inside a registered loop).
Verified recommended fix
Capture the return values of the recursive ppb_MS_microseq() calls at ppb_msq.c:301/:309 instead of checking only the *ret side-channel that initxfer's MS_RET(0) zeroes
Verdict
Reproduced on the QEMU guest (DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT x86_64), discovered during DF-5574 fix validation when the guard's EINVAL vanished. At ppb_msq.c:301 and :309 the two recursive ppb_MS_microseq() calls have their return values discarded; the caller checks only its local error, which is the *ret side-channel written by MS_RET β and the initxfer run at :301 ends with MS_RET(0), zeroing error immediately before the transfer loop executes. Any abort inside the mode transfer loop (adapter exec_microseq failure β e.g. vpio's nibble_inbyte_hook timeout, an MS_OP_C_CALL error β or the DF-5574 guard) therefore propagates nowhere: the aborted transfer is skipped and the sequence continues to the next instruction, reporting success (harness: hook returns 5, top-level rc=0 and the following MS_RET overwrites ret with 0). For vpo/imm this means a timed-out or failed ZIP read/write mid-transfer is presented to the SCSI layer as a completed transfer over stale buffer contents β a silent data-integrity failure, not memory corruption. The top-level ppb_MS_exec() does propagate its own return value, which is why single-opcode failures surface but loop failures do not. Fix validated: capturing the recursive return value (xerr) and folding in the side-channel makes the same case return rc=5 with ret untouched (0x77) β 'failure propagated (fixed)' β and is the same change that makes the DF-5574 guard observable (rc=22).
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