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DF-5241

PROBE_INQUIRY_BASIC_DV1/DV2: bcmp() reads SHORT_INQUIRY_LENGTH (36) bytes from a kmalloc(additional_length+5) buffer as small as 6 bytes (device-controlled heap OOB read)

Summary

probestart sizes the DV inquiry buffer from the device's own re-fetched additional_length (as few as 6 bytes when it answers 0 the second time) but probedone bcmps a fixed 36 bytes - up to 30 bytes past the allocation, feeding the DV1 comparison decision. Malicious SCSI/ATAPI target (USB gadget, untrusted SAN) comparison-oracle OOB read; exercised live in the DF-5240 run ('inquiry data fails comparison at DV1 step'). min()-bound fix.

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-5241 Β· 1 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
verdict.json file 1.0 KB view raw

Fix verification

not_testable
baseline no→ patch + rebuild →patched clean
per-fix-DF-5241

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Evidence (decisive lines)

static trace in finding markdown (DF-5241 live message in findings/poc/DF-5240/run.log)

Verified recommended fix

see finding markdown

Verdict

untested (Low oracle / Medium race-gated source-verified / Info accounting; Phase V not required per contract - DF-5241 exercised live inside the DF-5240 run)