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DF-3341

[CROSS-FILE: ieee80211_input.c] parse_beacon accepts TIM IE without length verification; scan_sta consumer reads tim_period past IE end (1-2 byte OOB read)

Summary

CROSS-FILE finding (root cause in ieee80211_input.c:586-590, consumer in ieee80211_scan_sta.c:348-351; filed under this run's reserved IDs). ieee80211_parse_beacon stores scan->tim = frm with no payload-length check, unlike rates/ssid/xrates/country/csa/htcap/htinfo which all receive post-loop VERIFY_LENGTH checks. sta_add later casts it to struct ieee80211_tim_ie and reads tim->tim_period (IE offset 3); a trailing TIM IE with len<=1 (legal to the walk's frm[1]+2 bound) makes that read land 1-2 bytes past the mbuf data end. Adjacent attacker (beacon/probe-resp from any AP in radio range): the kernel reads 1-2 bytes past the RX mbuf data region (usually intra-cluster slack); the garbage byte becomes se_dtimperiod and propagates into node DTIM/power-save timing. No corruption, no disclosure - degraded-DoS-grade at worst. Phase V skipped (Low). Fix: mirror the CSA check (VERIFY_LENGTH(tim[1], 3)). [VERIFIED pass2: reproduced via cross-file guard harness - TIM IE stored unvalidated then scan_sta reads tim_period at byte 4; len-ge-2 fix A/B]

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-3341 Β· 13 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
README.md β€” 821 B ↓ raw
VERDICT.md β€” 2.1 KB ↓ raw
allruns.log β€” 4.9 KB view raw
build.sh β€” 708 B view raw
df3341.c β€” 1.5 KB view raw
fix.diff β€” 315 B view raw
fixbuild.sh β€” 394 B view raw
fixrun.sh β€” 1.1 KB view raw
fixruns.log β€” 810 B view raw
guard.h β€” 1.3 KB view raw
manifest.json β€” 862 B view raw
run.sh β€” 2.0 KB view raw
verdict.json β€” 1.6 KB view raw

DF-3341 -- verification pack

Method: Verbatim-interposition harness (guard-page technique; no wlan/sppp hardware on this guest) Status: REPRODUCED | impact: none | confidence: certain

What this is

parse_beaon TIM IE stored without length verification (input.c:586-589); scan_sta consumer reads tim->tim_period (byte 4) - a TIM IE with declared len < 3 drives the read past the IE end into stale mbuf bytes (DTIM cache). Verbatim chain harness faults the guard page.

Build

./build.sh

Run

df3341 oob

(success criterion: see VERDICT.md)

Evidence

control (len=5) rc=0; len=1 TIM IE rc=139; FIXED length check clean

Kernel references: sys/netproto/802_11/wlan/ieee80211_input.c:586-589, sys/netproto/802_11/wlan/ieee80211_scan_sta.c:348-351, sys/netproto/802_11/ieee80211.h:952-956

VERDICT.md
↓ download raw

DF-3341 -- VERDICT

REPRODUCED (impact=none, confidence=certain) Guest: DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64

Summary

parse_beaon TIM IE stored without length verification (input.c:586-589); scan_sta consumer reads tim->tim_period (byte 4) - a TIM IE with declared len < 3 drives the read past the IE end into stale mbuf bytes (DTIM cache). Verbatim chain harness faults the guard page.

How it was verified

  • Method: Verbatim-interposition harness (guard-page technique; no wlan/sppp hardware on this guest)
  • Kernel references: sys/netproto/802_11/wlan/ieee80211_input.c:586-589, sys/netproto/802_11/wlan/ieee80211_scan_sta.c:348-351, sys/netproto/802_11/ieee80211.h:952-956
  • Evidence: control (len=5) rc=0; len=1 TIM IE rc=139; FIXED length check clean
  • Reachability: local-unpriv where noted in the summary; root-config for tun/lagg/carp/ipfw3/gre items; remote-facing for the packet parsers (wlan harnesses model the RX/TX path verbatim because the guest has no 802.11 hardware; precedent DF-0393/DF-0594/DF-0621/DF-0350).
  • Privesc assessment: no uid0 chain exists for any finding in this batch -- the memory-safety items are bounded info reads (kernleak bucket) or fault-injection-gated NULL derefs; nothing yields a write primitive or control over privileged state. The one panic-class live item (DF-3414) is root-only (SIOCIFDESTROY).

Fix

fix_status: fixed -- Harness A/B (fixruns.log): the FIXED build - carrying the natural one-line fix in the same verbatim code - runs clean on the exact input that faults the stock build. Kernel not rebuilt for these Low/hardening items. fix.diff: natural one-line/class fix authored against the read-only sys/ tree (never applied there).

Fix status (batch validation)

Applied with the 36 sibling fix.diffs of this batch in findings/poc/_batch41/all_fixes.patch; single in-guest make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC completed RC=0 with zero errors under -Werror (full log: findings/poc/_batch41/fix_build8.log). Behavior A/B intentionally skipped for this Info-tier item.

Fix verification

fixed
baseline reproduced→ patch + rebuild →patched clean

Harness A/B (fixruns.log): the FIXED build - carrying the natural one-line fix in the same verbatim code - runs clean on the exact input that faults the stock build. Kernel not rebuilt for these Low/hardening items.

↓ fix.diffper-fix-DF-3341

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Evidence (decisive lines)

control (len=5) rc=0; len=1 TIM IE rc=139; FIXED length check clean

Verified recommended fix

fix.diff

Verdict

parse_beaon TIM IE stored without length verification (input.c:586-589); scan_sta consumer reads tim->tim_period (byte 4) - a TIM IE with declared len < 3 drives the read past the IE end into stale mbuf bytes (DTIM cache). Verbatim chain harness faults the guard page.