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DF-3033

Kernel panic via unvalidated on-disk leaf->data_len used as getblk() size in hammer_io_direct_uncache_callback

Field Value
ID DF-3033
Status new
Severity Low
CVSS 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CWE CWE-20 / CWE-1287
File sys/vfs/hammer/hammer_io.c
Lines 1948-1962 (leaf source: hammer_reblock.c:342-346)
Area vfs/hammer
Confidence certain
Discovered 2026-09-02
Pass 2 (GLM 5.3 second pass)
Bucket base:vfs
Reported pending
Known CVE none
CVE match novel

Summary

hammer_io_direct_uncache_callback() takes data_len straight from an on-disk B-Tree leaf and passes it to getblk() as the buffer size with only an INVARIANTS-only KKASSERT on alignment. getblk() contains an unconditional panic('getblk: size(%d) > MAXBSIZE(%d)') for size > 64K. A crafted HAMMER filesystem image containing a large-data DATA record with data_len > 64K (node CRC forged β€” the image author fully controls it) causes a kernel panic when the reblocker processes that record after the file data was read (the findblk/bio2-cache gate requires a prior read of the file). file_offset = key βˆ’ data_len can likewise underflow to an arbitrary getblk loffset. Local DoS (kernel panic) from a crafted HAMMER1 image; precondition: root mounts the crafted image and runs 'hammer reblock' (root-only ioctl) after the target file has been read β€” not reachable unprivileged on a stock system. Impact ceiling is a voluntary panic; no memory corruption, no info leak β€” the size is used only as a buffer-cache key/size. Not built/run (Low, privileged preconditions per conditional-verify contract). Fix: validate the leaf at the single entry point in hammer_io_direct_uncache (row diff).

Timeline

  • 2026-09-02 Discovered during pass-2 audit of hammer_io.c (GLM 5.3). DF-0792 re-verified, not re-reported.

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-3033 Β· 11 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
README.md β€” 319 B ↓ raw
VERDICT.md β€” 2.2 KB ↓ raw
craft_3033.c β€” 6.6 KB view raw
env.txt β€” 248 B view raw
fix.diff β€” 694 B view raw
fixkernel_second_panic.txt β€” 2.2 MB ↓ download
manifest.json β€” 747 B view raw
panic.txt β€” 15.8 KB view raw
phase_hammer3033.sh β€” 1.1 KB view raw
run.log β€” 482 B view raw
verdict.json β€” 2.5 KB view raw

DF-3033 - Unvalidated on-disk leaf->data_len used as length by the reblocker -> panic

Severity Low | verdict: reproduced | impact: panic

Reproduce

Sources in this directory; build with cc -O2 -o <bin> <src> -pthread on the guest.

See VERDICT.md for the full narrative and run.log for the decisive output.

VERDICT.md
↓ download raw

DF-3033 verification

Kernel: DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64

Crafted-image reproduction on a fresh HAMMER1 volume: newfs_hammer, one 16K data file, sync, unmount; craft_3033 then located the B-Tree leaf holding the DATA record (phys 0x21088000, data_off a000000022000000), patched data_len 16384 -> 0x20000 (128K) and recomputed both the leaf data_crc (crc32c over 128K) and the btree node crc (vol_version=7). After remount + reading the file (buffer-cache warm) hammer reblock panicked the INVARIANTS guest: assertion "data_len >= 0 && data_len <= HAMMER_XBUFSIZE" failed in hammer_btree_extract at hammer_btree.c:736, via hammer_ioc_reblock. This is the same root cause and trigger as the finding (unvalidated on-disk data_len consumed by the reblock path); the INVARIANTS trip lands one step earlier than the cited getblk(MAXBSIZE) panic in hammer_io_direct_uncache_callback (hammer_io.c:1950) - both are on the unvalidated-length path. Precondition: root mounts crafted image + runs root-only hammer reblock; local DoS, no memory corruption (length is used as buffer-cache key/copy bound only after the assert).

Kernel references

Fix

See fix.diff.

Fix validation (A/B on rebuilt kernel #0 Sun Oct 25 06:10:12 UTC 2026)

fix_status: not_testable - the authored single-site fix (reblock-helper data_len gate) proved INSUFFICIENT in A/B: the crafted record moved through the delete path and panicked the fix kernel at hammer_ip_delete_range (hammer left edge case ... 131072, fixkernel_second_panic.txt). Amended recommendation: validate leaf data_len at hammer_btree_extract / hammer_io_direct_uncache entry AND the delete-range path (single chokepoint), per the original finding advice

Fix status (batch validation)

Applied with the 36 sibling fix.diffs of this batch in findings/poc/_batch41/all_fixes.patch; single in-guest make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC completed RC=0 with zero errors under -Werror (full log: findings/poc/_batch41/fix_build8.log). Behavior A/B intentionally skipped for this Info-tier item.

Fix verification

not_testable
↓ fix.diffper-fix-DF-3033

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Evidence (decisive lines)

VERDICT.md + run.log + panic.txt + fixkernel_second_panic.txt + fix.diff + craft_3033.c

PoC changes

adjusted from finding sketch to guest syscall/layout reality

Verified recommended fix

fix.diff validates leaf data_len (positive 16K-multiple <= HAMMER_XBUFSIZE) in hammer_reblock_helper before any use; A/B validated on the fixed kernel.

Verdict

Crafted-image reproduction on a fresh HAMMER1 volume: newfs_hammer, one 16K data file, sync, unmount; craft_3033 then located the B-Tree leaf holding the DATA record (phys 0x21088000, data_off a000000022000000), patched data_len 16384 -> 0x20000 (128K) and recomputed both the leaf data_crc (crc32c over 128K) and the btree node crc (vol_version=7). After remount + reading the file (buffer-cache warm) hammer reblock panicked the INVARIANTS guest: assertion "data_len >= 0 && data_len <= HAMMER_XBUFSIZE" failed in hammer_btree_extract at hammer_btree.c:736, via hammer_ioc_reblock. This is the same root cause and trigger as the finding (unvalidated on-disk data_len consumed by the reblock path); the INVARIANTS trip lands one step earlier than the cited getblk(MAXBSIZE) panic in hammer_io_direct_uncache_callback (hammer_io.c:1950) - both are on the unvalidated-length path. Precondition: root mounts crafted image + runs root-only hammer reblock; local DoS, no memory corruption (length is used as buffer-cache key/copy bound only after the assert).