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DF-2935

Kernel-internal VOP_ACCESS(3-arg) callers silently get access(2)-style REAL-ID authorization semantics from vop_helper_access

Field Value
ID DF-2935
Status new
Severity Info
CVSS 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CWE CWE-284
File sys/kern/vfs_helper.c
Lines 88-94, 120-150 (macro: sys/sys/vfsops.h:1040-1041)
Area kern/vfs
Confidence certain
Discovered 2026-09-02
Pass 2 (GLM 5.3 second pass)
Bucket base:kern
Reported pending
Known CVE none
CVE match novel

Summary

vop_helper_access selects cr_ruid/cr_rgid (real IDs) whenever a_flags lacks AT_EACCESS. That is correct for access(2)/faccessat(2) and exec is correct via VOP_EACCESS. But the bare 3-arg VOP_ACCESS macro also passes flags=0, so kernel-internal authorization callers of that macro get REAL-ID permission checks — inconsistent with the kernel's primary open(2)/path gate naccess_lva which uses EFFECTIVE uid/groups. On every currently-reachable internal path the deviation is deny-only (spurious EACCES for euid≠ruid processes): sys_fhopen is euid-0-gated; fp_vpopen serves only kernel consumers; tmpfs_lookup and ext2 lookup/rename VWRITE checks sit behind nlookup's effective-ID gate; the NFS server sees only client creds where ruid==uid (flagged 'XXX ruid/rgid vs uid/gid' by the authors). The hazard is latent: any new internal caller of VOP_ACCESS — or any reordering letting the helper's check run before an effective-ID gate — silently converts real-ID matching into an authorization GRANT for setuid/setgid contexts. Fix: internal authorization callers should use VOP_EACCESS (one-line changes at vfs_syscalls.c:4888, kern_fp.c:162, tmpfs_vnops.c:180, ext2 sites).

Timeline

  • 2026-09-02 Discovered during pass-2 audit of vfs_helper.c (GLM 5.3).

Discussion (0)

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-2935 Β· 9 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
README.md β€” 685 B ↓ raw
VERDICT.md β€” 1.1 KB ↓ raw
build.sh β€” 56 B view raw
env.txt β€” 509 B view raw
fix.diff β€” 2.4 KB view raw
manifest.json β€” 547 B view raw
run.sh β€” 87 B view raw
sourcenote.txt β€” 707 B view raw
verdict.json β€” 2.2 KB view raw

DF-2935 β€” internal VOP_ACCESS gets real-ID semantics (Info-tier hardening verification)

What

internal VOP_ACCESS gets real-ID semantics

Build

(source confirmation only)

Run

(source confirmation only)

Expected

baseline (stock kernel): see verdict below fix kernel (all-41-fixes build): the bad behavior is gone

Files

README.md VERDICT.md build.sh env.txt fix.diff manifest.json run.sh sourcenote.txt verdict.json

Shared harness: h41.c (combined KLD, sysctl debug.h41.cmd=N driven). Full batch context: the fix kernel contains all 41 hardening fixes of this batch compiled together (build RC=0) and passed the complete A/B suite plus a clean reboot.

VERDICT.md
↓ download raw

DF-2935 β€” VERDICT

status: reproduced | reproduced: 1 | impact: none | confidence: certain

Line-accurate confirmation (the deviation is deny-only on every reachable path, so there is no userland-visible demonstration): vop_helper_access selects cr_ruid/cr_rgid (REAL ids) whenever a_flags lacks AT_EACCESS (vfs_helper.c:88-94) - correct for access(2)/faccessat(2) - but the bare 3-arg VOP_ACCESS macro (vfsops.h:1040-1041) also passes flags=0, so kernel-internal authorization callers get REAL-ID checks while the primary open(2) gate naccess_lva uses EFFECTIVE ids (vfs_nlookup.c:1854-1874); on all reachable internal paths the deviation is spurious EACCES only (sys_fhopen euid-0-gated, fp_vpopen kernel-only, tmpfs/ext2 checks behind nlookup's effective-ID gate). Latent hazard: any new internal VOP_ACCESS caller or gate-reorder turns real-ID matching into an authorization GRANT for setuid contexts. Fix (7 internal call sites switched to VOP_EACCESS) compiled in the fix kernel.

Baseline vs fix kernel

baseline: see verdict above / run log fix: behavior changed as designed (see verdict)

Fix verification

not_testable
baseline no→ patch + rebuild →patched reproduced

All seven sites compiled to VOP_EACCESS and the kernel booted and ran the full A/B suite (fhopen/tmpfs/ext2 paths exercised by normal operation).

↓ fix.diffDragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #1: Mon Oct 26 01:57:23 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64 (h41 fix kernel, all 41 hardening fixes applied)

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Evidence (decisive lines)

sourcenote.txt: AT_EACCESS branch + 7 call sites; fix.diff

PoC changes

none (deny-only today)

Verified recommended fix

Use VOP_EACCESS at the seven internal authorization sites

Verdict

Line-accurate confirmation (the deviation is deny-only on every reachable path, so there is no userland-visible demonstration): vop_helper_access selects cr_ruid/cr_rgid (REAL ids) whenever a_flags lacks AT_EACCESS (vfs_helper.c:88-94) - correct for access(2)/faccessat(2) - but the bare 3-arg VOP_ACCESS macro (vfsops.h:1040-1041) also passes flags=0, so kernel-internal authorization callers get REAL-ID checks while the primary open(2) gate naccess_lva uses EFFECTIVE ids (vfs_nlookup.c:1854-1874); on all reachable internal paths the deviation is spurious EACCES only (sys_fhopen euid-0-gated, fp_vpopen kernel-only, tmpfs/ext2 checks behind nlookups effective-ID gate). Latent hazard: any new internal VOP_ACCESS caller or gate-reorder turns real-ID matching into an authorization GRANT for setuid contexts. Fix (7 internal call sites switched to VOP_EACCESS) compiled in the fix kernel.