sockbuf drop/flush family ignores M_SOLOCKED — latent use-after-free window against sorecvtcp's token-released uiomove loop
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | DF-2893 |
| Status | new |
| Severity | Info |
| CVSS 3.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N |
| CWE | CWE-667 Improper Locking |
| File | sys/kern/uipc_sockbuf.c |
| Lines | 473-535, 451-465, 548-578 (honored only at :376) |
| Area | kern |
| Confidence | speculative |
| Discovered 2026-09-02 | |
| Pass | 2 (GLM 5.3 second pass) |
| Bucket | memcorrupt |
| Reported | pending |
| Known CVE | none |
| CVE match | novel |
Summary
sorecvtcp marks a window of so_rcv mbufs M_SOLOCKED, releases the ssb token, and uiomoves directly out of them. The design contract is that every concurrent mutator honors the flag; but only sbcompress checks it. sbdrop, sbdroprecord, sbflush and sbunlinkmbuf will trim/unlink/free M_SOLOCKED mbufs without any check — a concurrent flush during the unlocked uiomove loop would yield a kernel UAF read (freed mbuf data copied to userspace) and a freed-pointer chase. Today latent: for TCP the sole so_rcv mutators during a live recv are sbappendstream/sbcompress, the soclose-triggered sbflush is excluded by the recv syscall's file-reference hold, RST teardown does not flush so_rcv; the only in-tree so_rcv dropper on a protocol callback (sco_input) is bluetooth-hw-gated. Defense-in-depth: one new protocol or a sorecvtcp conversion turns this into a direct UAF. Fix: KKASSERT/skip M_SOLOCKED in the drop/flush family (row diff).
Timeline
- 2026-09-02 Discovered during pass-2 audit of uipc_sockbuf.c (GLM 5.3).
No comments yet.