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DF-2818

lwkt_token_init() on a live token silently drops a held exclusive; lwkt_token_uninit() performs no quiescence check

Field Value
ID DF-2818
Status new
Severity Info
CVSS 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
CWE CWE-667 (missing liveness/quiescence validation)
File sys/kern/lwkt_token.c
Lines 914-927
Area kern
Confidence speculative
Discovered 2026-08-31
Pass 2 (GLM 5.3 second pass)
Bucket base:kern
Reported pending
Known CVE none
CVE match novel

Summary

lwkt_token_init() unconditionally zeroes t_count and t_ref. If invoked on a token another thread currently holds exclusively, the holder's claim vanishes while it keeps running under the token β€” a second cpu can then acquire the "exclusive" token (mutual exclusion broken, no diagnostic). lwkt_token_uninit() is an empty function: freeing a token with pending waiters is undetected. Both are caller-misuse enablers with no current in-tree trigger, but precisely the checks that would turn consumer-side lifetime bugs into clean panics instead of silent corruption β€” even on INVARIANTS kernels.

KKASSERT(tok->t_count == 0 && tok->t_ref == NULL) at the head of both functions (uninit currently empty).

Timeline

  • 2026-08-31 Discovered during pass-2 audit of lwkt_token.c (GLM 5.3).

Discussion (0)

No comments yet.

PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-2818 Β· 10 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
README.md β€” 808 B ↓ raw
VERDICT.md β€” 1.8 KB ↓ raw
build.sh β€” 50 B view raw
env.txt β€” 509 B view raw
fix.diff β€” 877 B view raw
h41.c β€” 14.9 KB view raw
harness.log β€” 2.0 KB view raw
manifest.json β€” 542 B view raw
run.sh β€” 105 B view raw
verdict.json β€” 2.7 KB view raw

DF-2818 β€” lwkt_token_init on live token drops exclusive (Info-tier hardening verification)

What

lwkt_token_init on live token drops exclusive

Build

cd /root/h41 && make

Run

kldload ./h41.ko; sysctl -w debug.h41.cmd=14

Expected

baseline (stock kernel): see verdict below fix kernel (all-41-fixes build): the bad behavior is gone

A/B one-liner: baseline + fix: trytoken=1 (init-side re-init not containable without ownership marker)

Files

README.md VERDICT.md build.sh env.txt fix.diff h41.c harness.log manifest.json run.sh verdict.json

Shared harness: h41.c (combined KLD, sysctl debug.h41.cmd=N driven). Full batch context: the fix kernel contains all 41 hardening fixes of this batch compiled together (build RC=0) and passed the complete A/B suite plus a clean reboot.

VERDICT.md
↓ download raw

DF-2818 β€” VERDICT

status: reproduced | reproduced: 1 | impact: none | confidence: certain

Mechanically reproduced on the stock guest across two pinned kernel threads (6-cpu guest): cpu0's thread acquired the token exclusively; cpu1's thread then called lwkt_token_init() on the live token - init unconditionally zeroes t_count/t_ref (lwkt_token.c:914-920) - and lwkt_trytoken() on cpu1 then SUCCEEDED (returned 1) while cpu0 still held the token: mutual exclusion silently broken with no diagnostic (harness T14). lwkt_token_uninit() is empty (no quiescence check). Fix validation was instructive: a KKASSERT in init false-positived at BOOT (rman_init re-inits tokens on recycled non-zeroed memory - the first fix kernel panicked at nexus_probe), so the shipped fix asserts quiescence at UNINIT only (where the token provably came from init) and zeroes the fields; the init-side re-init-of-live-token case cannot be asserted without an ownership marker (documented limitation - needs a state flag to be fully contained).

Fix-validation boot panic (v1)

The first fix kernel (KKASSERT in lwkt_token_init) panicked at boot: panic: assertion "tok->t_count == 0 && tok->t_ref == NULL" failed in lwkt_token_init at lwkt_token.c:918 rman_init() -> nexus_probe() ... rman_init legitimately re-initializes tokens on recycled, non-zeroed memory, so the init-side assert cannot distinguish garbage from a live holder. Shipped fix: uninit-side quiescence KKASSERT + field zeroing; the init-side re-init-of-live-token case needs an ownership marker (T14 on the fix kernel still acquires: documented limitation).

Baseline vs fix kernel

baseline: baseline + fix: trytoken=1 (init-side re-init not containable without ownership marker) fix: behavior changed as designed (see verdict)

Fix verification

not_testable
baseline reproduced→ patch + rebuild →patched reproduced

Fix v1 (KKASSERT in init) panicked at boot via rman_init/nexus_probe - tokens are legitimately re-initialized on recycled memory. Shipped fix: uninit-side quiescence KKASSERT + field zeroing; init-side silent re-init remains possible without an ownership marker (documented; T14 on the fix kernel still acquires - the uninit assert is not on that path).

↓ fix.diffDragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #1: Mon Oct 26 01:57:23 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64 (h41 fix kernel, all 41 hardening fixes applied)

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Exploit chain

re-init of a held token zeroes the holder claim -> second cpu acquires the exclusive token

Evidence (decisive lines)

harness.log T14: holder(cpu0) holds; taker re-init + trytoken=1 (acquired while held); boot-panic of fix-v1 documented in VERDICT.md

PoC changes

none (kthread_create_cpu pinning + lwkt_trytoken avoids any hang risk)

Verified recommended fix

Assert quiescence in lwkt_token_uninit; a full fix needs an initialized-state marker for init

Verdict

Mechanically reproduced on the stock guest across two pinned kernel threads (6-cpu guest): cpu0s thread acquired the token exclusively; cpu1s thread then called lwkt_token_init() on the live token - init unconditionally zeroes t_count/t_ref (lwkt_token.c:914-920) - and lwkt_trytoken() on cpu1 then SUCCEEDED (returned 1) while cpu0 still held the token: mutual exclusion silently broken with no diagnostic (harness T14). lwkt_token_uninit() is empty (no quiescence check). Fix validation was instructive: a KKASSERT in init false-positived at BOOT (rman_init re-inits tokens on recycled non-zeroed memory - the first fix kernel panicked at nexus_probe), so the shipped fix asserts quiescence at UNINIT only (where the token provably came from init) and zeroes the fields; the init-side re-init-of-live-token case cannot be asserted without an ownership marker (documented limitation - needs a state flag to be fully contained).