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DF-2510

Unbounded ctlr->channels (up to 32) overflows the fixed interrupt[8] dispatch array causing heap OOB write of function pointers and OOB indirect call on every IRQ

Summary

ata_ahci_chipinit derives ctlr->channels directly from attacker-influenceable AHCI MMIO registers (flsl(PI) up to 32 and (CAP&NPMASK)+1 up to 32) with no upper bound. channels>8 makes ata_pci_setup_intr WRITE two attacker-influenceable pointers past end of controller softc into adjacent kernel heap during channel attach and makes ata_generic_intr READ interrupt[unit] out of bounds on every IRQ and CALL the wild function pointer. Heap OOB write during attach + OOB indirect call on first IRQ => kernel panic DoS or kernel code execution with heap grooming. Same bug class as DF-2492. Attacker: malicious PCIe card vfio PCI passthrough patched QEMU AHCI device. No userland privilege required corruption happens during DRIVER_ATTACH.

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-2510 Β· 7 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
VERDICT.md verdict HW-gate analysis + source trace + fix summary 1.8 KB ↓ raw
fix.diff suggested-fix git-apply-able defense-in-depth fix (applies + compiles) 834 B view raw
fix_build.log build-log combined build proof: all 18 fix.diffs compile in X86_64_GENERIC (-Werror, rc=0); each diff also passes git apply --check 404 B view raw
manifest.json manifest this catalog 1.5 KB view raw
env.txt environment guest uname + PCI/kldstat/dev inventory proving the gate 3.6 KB view raw
build.sh build-script no-op (HW-gated, nothing to build) 356 B view raw
run.sh run-script no-op (HW-gated, nothing to run) 268 B view raw
VERDICT.md verdict HW-gate analysis + source trace + fix summary
↓ download raw

DF-2510 β€” Unbounded ctlr->channels (up to 32 from AHCI CAP/PI MMIO) overflows interrupt[8]

Verdict

NOT REPRODUCED (hardware / trigger gated). The cited vulnerable code path exists in sys/dev/disk/nata/chipsets/ata-ahci.c and is compiled into the X86_64_GENERIC kernel, but it is not exercisable at runtime on this QEMU guest because the required HBA / device / trigger is absent. Confidence in the source bug itself: certain.

Why it cannot be reproduced here (the gate)

Hard-gated: needs an AHCI controller. The guest has NO AHCI (PIIX3 IDE only); ata_ahci_chipinit never runs.

See env.txt for the full guest PCI/kldstat/dev-node inventory that proves the gate.

The bug is real in source (traced line-by-line)

Cited path: - sys/dev/disk/nata/chipsets/ata-ahci.c:100-103 - sys/dev/disk/nata/ata-pci.h:67 - The vulnerable construct is present verbatim in the current master source (confirmed by direct read of the cited lines during verification). - A defense-in-depth fix.diff that closes the path is included and was validated to apply (git apply --check) and to compile cleanly in a full X86_64_GENERIC kernel build with -Werror (build rc=0).

Fix

Cap ctlr->channels to NELEM(ctlr->interrupt) (8) after deriving it from CAP/PI, complementing the DF-2492 bounds checks in the interrupt dispatch.

The standalone git-apply-able diff is fix.diff.

Reproduce

./build.sh && ./run.sh β€” both are no-ops on this guest by design (the gate holds). Exercising the path requires the corresponding HBA/device/trigger (ATA disk / ATAPI floppy or tape / NVMe controller / AdvanSys HBA / AHCI controller / a malicious ATAPI device / a CD burner / hot-unplug).

Status

status: not_reproduced | reproduced: 0 | impact: none (HW-gated) fix_status: not_testable (path cannot run on this guest; diff applies + compiles)

Fix verification

not_testable
baseline no→ patch + rebuild →patched clean

not_testable: the vulnerable path is unreachable on this guest (no target HW/malicious device). Fix validated structurally: git apply --check OK + full kernel build rc=0 (-Werror).

git apply --check findings/poc/DF-2510/fix.diff -> OK. Combined kernel build: 'NK_DONE rc=0'. No runtime before/after possible (HW-gated).
↓ fix.diffX86_64_GENERIC built with batch fix.diffs (gcc 8.3, -Werror, build rc=0) β€” not booted; no target HW to exercise either kernel.

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Exploit chain

none β€” valid hard blocker (driver/device path dead at runtime on this guest: no target HBA / no malicious device / no removable media). No unprivileged->root path.

Evidence (decisive lines)

kldstat -> kernel/ehci/xhci only (no target driver); pciconf -l -> PIIX3 IDE + virtio only (no AHCI/NVMe/AdvanSys HBA); camcontrol devlist -> only <QEMU QEMU DVD-ROM>; ls /dev/<target> -> No such file. Source confirmed at cited lines.

PoC changes

Created findings/poc/DF-2510/{VERDICT.md,fix.diff,env.txt,build.sh,run.sh,manifest.json,fix_build.log}. No PoC source (HW-gated).

Verified recommended fix

Defense-in-depth fix.diff adds the validation/bounds check closing the cited path (see findings/poc/DF-2510/fix.diff; git apply --check OK).

Verdict

NOT REPRODUCED (HW/trigger-gated on this guest). The bug is REAL in source (traced line-by-line): nata chipsets/ata-ahci unbounded ctlr->channels overflows interrupt[8] (no AHCI controller). Gate confirmed via kldstat (target driver not loaded; only kernel+ehci+xhci), pciconf -l (no target HBA β€” only PIIX3 IDE atapci0 + virtio), camcontrol devlist (only QEMU DVD-ROM), and ls /dev (no target disk/tape/fd/nvme nodes). The benign QEMU devices cannot produce the malicious device responses the bugs require.