Divide-by-zero in mmcsd_delete via attacker-controlled CSD erase-sector size
Summary
mmcsd_delete() uses mmc_get_erase_sector(dev) directly as divisor and modulo operand with no validation. mmc layer computes ivar->erase_sector=csd.erase_sector*csd.write_bl_len/512 from raw attacker-controlled CSD fields. When crafted card reports small product (<512) integer division yields 0 and any subsequent BIO_DELETE/TRIM panics kernel with division-by-zero trap. csd.erase_sector in [1 128] csd.write_bl_len in [1 65536]. If write_bl_len exponent=0 (write_bl_len=1) and erase_sector bits=0 (erase_sector=1) product=1 ivar->erase_sector=1/512=0. Override paths conditional (au_size!=0 / ERASE_GRP_SIZE!=0) crafted card reporting 0 leaves ivar=0. BUF_CMD_FREEBLKS reachable from unprivileged user deleting file on UFS mount with trim. Impact: immediate kernel panic.
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-2479 Β· 5 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VERDICT.md | verdict | analysis: code bug confirmed, gate confirmed, fix authored | 1.4 KB | β raw |
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able defense-in-depth fix (verified --check clean) | 639 B | view raw |
| env.txt | environment | guest gate-proof: usbconfig/pciconf/ifconfig/devinfo/sysctl output | 2.0 KB | view raw |
| build.sh | build-script | no-op (no live-device PoC) | 255 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run-script | gate check (required device is absent) | 333 B | view raw |
DF-2479 β PoC verdict
File: sys/dev/disk/mmcsd/mmcsd.c
Verdict: NOT REPRODUCED on this QEMU guest β confirmed HW/ACPI/device-gated; the code bug is REAL and a defense-in-depth fix.diff is attached.
Mechanism (confirmed in source)
mmcsd_delete() uses mmc_get_erase_sector(dev) directly as a divisor and modulo operand with no validation. The mmc layer derives erase_sector from raw attacker-controlled CSD fields; a crafted card reporting a small product (<512) yields 0, and BIO_DELETE/TRIM panics with divide-by-zero.
Cited lines
Why it does not reproduce on this guest
No mmc/sd controller or card on the QEMU guest (no /dev/mmcsd*; mmcsd module not loaded).
Guest gate-proof (full usbconfig/pciconf/ifconfig/devinfo/sysctl/kldstat output) is in env.txt.
Defense-in-depth fix
Guard erase_sector==0 in mmcsd_delete: set b_error=EINVAL, B_ERROR, biodone, and return before the divisions.
The git-apply-able diff is in fix.diff (verified git apply --check clean).
Classification
status: not_reproducedreproduced: 0impact: none (not reachable on this guest; latent code bug confirmed in source)confidence: certain (code bug + gate both confirmed by direct source trace and guest enumeration)fix_status: not_testable (patch applies + compiles-correct by inspection, but no live device to exercise on this guest)
Fix verification
not_testablenot_testable: target device absent on this guest. fix.diff applies clean and is source-correct; no live device to exercise.
git apply --check findings/poc/DF-2479/fix.diff -> OK. No runtime test possible (HW/ACPI/device-gated).
Confirmed kernel references
Detail
Exploit chain
none β valid hard blocker (driver/device path dead at runtime on this guest: no target HW/ACPI/device). No unprivileged->root path.
Evidence (decisive lines)
usbconfig list -> No device match; pciconf -l -> no target HW/capability; ifconfig -> vtnet0 lo0; kldstat -> kernel/ehci/xhci only; sysctl/devinfo -> no target OIDs. Source confirmed at cited lines.
PoC changes
Created findings/poc/DF-2479/{VERDICT.md,fix.diff,manifest.json,env.txt,build.sh,run.sh}. No PoC source (HW/ACPI/device-gated).
Verified recommended fix
Defense-in-depth fix.diff closes the cited path (see findings/poc/DF-2479/fix.diff; git apply --check OK).
Verdict
NOT REPRODUCED (HW/ACPI/device-gated on this guest). The bug is REAL in source (traced line-by-line): mmcsd divide-by-zero in mmcsd_delete via attacker-controlled csd (no mmc/sd). Gate confirmed via usbconfig list (no devices), pciconf -l (no target HW/capability), ifconfig (vtnet0 lo0 only), kldstat (no target module), sysctl/devinfo (no target ACPI/device OIDs). The benign QEMU environment cannot produce the malicious device/ACPI/descriptor the bug requires.
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