Unclamped csio->cdb_len and csio->sense_len allow OOB read of cdb_bytes and OOB write of sense_data in vpo_intr
Summary
vpo_intr L220-228 forwards csio->cdb_len and csio->sense_len to imm_do_scsi/vpoio_do_scsi without clamping to inline buffer sizes: cdb_bytes[IOCDBLEN=16] cam_ccb.h:587 sense_data[SSD_FULL_SIZE=32] scsi_all.h. Send loop vpoio.c:715 for(k=0;k<clen;k++) reads &command[k] k=0..254 reading 239 bytes adjacent csio fields (cdb_io.cdb_ptr union msg_ptr kernel pointer). Receive loop vpoio.c:741/757 writes buffer[0..count-1] bounded by blen=255 not buffer size 32 -> 223 bytes OOB write into sense_len/cdb_len/sglist_cnt/scsi_status/sense_resid/resid/cdb_io/msg_ptr/msg_len/tag_action/tag_id/init_id. Same pattern DF-1088(pass)/DF-1510/DF-1546/DF-1547. Priv-gated root-only /dev/passN SYSCAP_RESTRICTEDROOT scsi_pass.c:308; sg caps IOCDBLEN scsi_sg.c:507; periphs sense_len=SSD_FULL_SIZE. Malicious parallel-port SCSI target returns >32 bytes sense -> OOB write attacker-controlled. Fix: clamp cdb_len<=sizeof(cdb_bytes) sense_len<=sizeof(sense_data) at vpo_intr entry.
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-1958 Β· 4 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able fix for the cited bug | 779 B | view raw |
| VERDICT.md | verdict | source-confirmation analysis | 1.0 KB | β raw |
| build.sh | build-script | N/A (source-only) | 65 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run-script | N/A (source-only) | 89 B | view raw |
DF-1958 VERDICT
Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-confirmed)
Impact: Low (driver-level NULL deref / OOB / leak / DoS β hardware-gated)
Mechanism: vpo_intr L220-228 forwards csio->cdb_len and csio->sense_len to imm_do_scsi/vpoio_do_scsi without clamping to inline buffer sizes: cdb_bytes[IOCDBLEN=16] cam_ccb.h:587 sense_data[SSD_FULL_SIZE=32] scs
Citation: sys/dev/disk/vpo/vpo.c:220-284
Fix: Applied fix.diff β compiles in batch kernel build (rc=0, -Werror).
Verification method: Source-only line-by-line trace of cited path:line. Low-severity driver bug; PoC trigger requires specific hardware or root context. Confirmed the cited vulnerable pattern exists in source.
Fix status (batch validation)
Applied with the 36 sibling fix.diffs of this batch in findings/poc/_batch41/all_fixes.patch; single in-guest make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC completed RC=0 with zero errors under -Werror (full log: findings/poc/_batch41/fix_build8.log). Behavior A/B intentionally skipped for this Info-tier item.
Fix verification
fixedfix.diff compiled in batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror
fix.diff compiled in batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror
Confirmed kernel references
β
Detail
Exploit chain
none (Low severity)
Evidence (decisive lines)
Source-confirmed: unclamped csio->cdb_len OOB reads cdb_bytes (vpo.c:220-284)
Verified recommended fix
Source-confirmed: unclamped csio->cdb_len OOB reads cdb_bytes (vpo.c:220-284)
Verdict
Source-confirmed: unclamped csio->cdb_len OOB reads cdb_bytes (vpo.c:220-284)
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