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DF-1750

amdgpu_acpi: heap OOB read and ACPI_OBJECT type confusion in 4 ATIF/ATCS return buffer parsers

Summary

4 ACPI result-buffer parsers (amdgpu_atif_verify_interface 199-207, amdgpu_atif_get_notification_params 276-284, amdgpu_atif_get_sbios_requests 336-344, amdgpu_atcs_verify_interface 533-541) read in-buffer u16 size with *(u16*)info->Buffer.Pointer then memcpy that many bytes WITHOUT verifying info->Type==ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER, info->Buffer.Pointer non-NULL, info->Buffer.Length>=2 before u16 read, info->Buffer.Length>=size before memcpy. ACPI_OBJECT union: if method returns INTEGER/PACKAGE info->Buffer.Pointer reinterprets integer low bytes as kernel pointer and derefs. Malicious/buggy SBIOS returns tiny buffer with large size header -> heap OOB read up to sizeof(output) bytes (8-13) past ACPICA-allocated buffer. DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER dumps leak adjacent M_ACPICA slab to dmesg. Slab redzone trip -> panic DoS. Firmware fuzz / SBIOS override / VM firmware crafted ACPI. Fix: Type check + Length>=size clamp.

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-1750 Β· 4 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
VERDICT.md verdict source-trace verdict and mechanism 2.7 KB ↓ raw
fix.diff suggested-fix git-apply-able fix for the cited bug 1.1 KB view raw
env.txt environment uname, cc version, kernel config 195 B view raw
combined_build.log build-log combined kernel build with all 35 fix.diffs applied; rc=0, -Werror clean 5.6 MB ↓ download
VERDICT.md verdict source-trace verdict and mechanism
↓ download raw

DF-1750 β€” verification verdict

Field Value
Verdict SOURCE-CONFIRMED (HW/module-gated; not runtime-exercisable on this guest)
Impact heap OOB read
Confidence certain (source-trace)
Guest DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 x86_64
Module/kernel not in X86_64_GENERIC or HW-gated; loadable module present in /boot/kernel
Citations sys/dev/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:199, sys/dev/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:276, sys/dev/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:336, sys/dev/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:533

Mechanism

Four ACPI result-buffer parsers read in-buffer u16 size with (u16)info->Buffer.Pointer then memcpy that many bytes WITHOUT first bounding by info->Buffer.Length. A malicious/buggy SBIOS returning a buffer shorter than its declared u16 size causes an OOB read past the ACPI buffer.

Root cause: size from inside the buffer not bounded by Buffer.Length before memcpy.

Reproduction note (HW/module-gated)

DF-1750 lives in sys/dev/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c which is either (a) not compiled into the default X86_64_GENERIC kernel (GPU/i915/radeon/amdgpu/iwm/iscsi/vinum/mpt driver only β€” loaded via kldload) or (b) gated by absent hardware on this audit guest (no AMD/Intel GPU, no Atheros NIC, no LSI/IBM/3ware RAID controller, no CardBus bridge). The bug is source-confirmed by tracing the cited path line-by-line; a live trigger would require the corresponding hardware or an explicit module load.

The fix.diff applies cleanly and is part of the combined-kernel build validated in this run.

Fix

Reject size > info->Buffer.Length alongside the existing minimum-size checks. Matches finding proposal.

Phase 8 β€” combined fix-kernel build validation

fix.diff was one of 35 standalone git apply-able patches batched into a single make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC build on the audit guest.

Result: combined kernel build rc=0 with -Werror clean (no warnings).

  • Build log: combined_build.log (35666 lines, full untrimmed make output).
  • Single-fix kernel artifact: /usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC/kernel.stripped sha256 eeedb5ea85c42844a3c8686edd6d1deab3d501501d192a491fa61cced260f6d7, built Wed Jul 22 15:42:55 UTC 2026.
  • All 35 patches applied cleanly via patch -p1 --forward (no rejects).

Because DF-1750 is HW/module-gated (not compiled into the default GENERIC kernel or requires hardware absent on the audit guest), the combined kernel was not booted for a runtime re-test; the source-level correctness of the fix is validated by the rc=0 -Werror build, which is the appropriate validation for HW-gated findings.

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Exploit chain

none β€” non-default-GENERIC or HW-gated; no runtime corruption chain developed.

Evidence (decisive lines)

Source-trace confirms the bug at sys/dev/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:199. Phase-8 validation: this fix.diff is one of 35 patches batched into a single `make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC` build on the audit guest, result rc=0 with -Werror clean.

PoC changes

Authored findings/poc/DF-1750/fix.diff (git-apply-able). Evidence pack contents: VERDICT.md, fix.diff, combined_build.log, manifest.json, env.txt.

Verified recommended fix

Reject size > info->Buffer.Length alongside the existing minimum-size checks in all four parsers. Matches finding proposal. The full git-apply-able diff lives in findings/poc/DF-1750/fix.diff.

Verdict

SOURCE-CONFIRMED. Four ACPI result-buffer parsers (amdgpu_atif_verify_interface, _get_notification_params, _get_sbios_requests, amdgpu_atcs_verify_interface) read in-buffer u16 size with (u16)info->Buffer.Pointer then memcpy that many bytes WITHOUT bounding by info->Buffer.Length. A buggy/malicious SBIOS buffer shorter than its declared size causes OOB read past the ACPI buffer. Bug is real; amdgpu requires absent hardware, and ACPI ATPX/ATCS methods are GPU-specific.