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DF-1677

nvme: queue alloc/free/create/delete helpers accept uint16_t qid without validating against NVME_MAX_QUEUES

Field Value
ID DF-1677
File sys/dev/disk/nvme/nvme.c
Lines 128, 139, 235, 246, 276, 304, 790, 794, 814, 891
Severity Info
CVSS 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
CWE CWE-129 Improper Validation of Array Index; CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
Confidence certain
Status new
CVE match dfly_specific
Created 2026-07-18

Summary

nvme_alloc_subqueue(), nvme_alloc_comqueue(), nvme_free_subqueue(), nvme_free_comqueue(), nvme_create_subqueue(), nvme_create_comqueue(), and nvme_delete_comqueue() all take a uint16_t qid (range 0..65535) but immediately use it to index sc->subqueues[NVME_MAX_QUEUES=1024] or sc->comqueues[1024] with no bounds check.

All current callers (solely the admin thread state machine in nvme_admin.c and the attach path) pass values bounded to < NVME_MAX_QUEUES, so there is no exploitable path today, but the API offers no defensive boundary β€” any future caller passing an unchecked qid (e.g. from a device response or a new ioctl) would produce a direct out-of-bounds access into the multi-hundred-KB softc.

Root cause

nvme_alloc_subqueue nvme.c:128:

nvme_subqueue_t *queue = &sc->subqueues[qid];

β€” qid is uint16_t, subqueues is [NVME_MAX_QUEUES=1024]. nvme_alloc_subqueue:139 then computes NVME_REG_SUBQ_BELL(qid, sc->dstrd4) which for qid>=1024 produces a doorbell MMIO offset 0x1000 + (qid*2)*dstrd4 far beyond the BAR β€” writing this could fault the PCI config/MMIO path.

nvme_alloc_comqueue nvme.c:235 and nvme_free_subqueue nvme.c:276 / nvme_free_comqueue nvme.c:304 have the identical unchecked &sc->{sub,com}queues[qid] dereference.

nvme_create_subqueue nvme.c:790, nvme_create_comqueue nvme.c:814, nvme_delete_comqueue nvme.c:891 likewise.

The contract explicitly calls out "Missing bounds on queue array indexing" as a focus area.

Threat model

No current exploit path β€” all callers (nvme_admin_state_make_queues bounded by NVME_MAX_QUEUES-1 at nvme_admin.c:296-299, nvme_admin_thread cleanup loop bounded by sc->niosubqs/niocomqs at nvme_admin.c:193-200, and nvme_attach.c:401/407 for qid=0) pass in-range values.

The risk is regression: a future patch that introduces a qid sourced from device data or an ioctl would have no guardrail. Filed as hardening/defense-in-depth.

Add a one-line guard at the entry of each of the seven helpers. Example for nvme_alloc_subqueue (apply identically to the other six):

--- a/sys/dev/disk/nvme/nvme.c
+++ b/sys/dev/disk/nvme/nvme.c
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ nvme_enable(nvme_softc_t *sc, int enable)
 int
 nvme_alloc_subqueue(nvme_softc_t *sc, uint16_t qid)
 {
+   if (qid >= NVME_MAX_QUEUES)
+       return EINVAL;
    nvme_subqueue_t *queue = &sc->subqueues[qid];
    int error = 0;

For the void-returning free_* variants, use if (qid >= NVME_MAX_QUEUES) return;. For create_*/delete_* which currently always succeed the qid indexing before issuing the admin command, returning EINVAL early is the safe choice.

This converts a latent OOB into an explicit, documented API contract.

  • DF-1676 (sibling: live nvme_poll_completions OOB via device-controlled indices β€” different sink, same "queue array missing bounds" theme)

Discussion (0)

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-1677 Β· 3 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
VERDICT.md verdict source-only confirmation + mechanism + fix 1.7 KB ↓ raw
fix.diff suggested-fix Add qid < sc->niosqs/sc->niocqs (or appropriate per-queue max) bounds check at t 676 B view raw
../fix_build_new.log build-log Batch kernel build with new fixes (rc=0, -Werror) 5.6 MB ↓ download
VERDICT.md verdict source-only confirmation + mechanism + fix
↓ download raw

DF-1677 β€” PoC Verification Verdict

Category: nvme (IN GENERIC) Source: sys/dev/disk/nvme/nvme.c:128-891 Guest: DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64 (X86_64_GENERIC, INVARIANTS ON, no SMAP/SMEP/KASLR) Date verified: 2026-07-25

Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-only confirmation; GENERIC-compiled, no HW)

Mechanism

nvme_alloc_subqueue/nvme_alloc_comqueue/etc accept uint16_t qid and index sc->subqueues[qid]/completequeues[qid] without checking qid < sc->max_qid. Caller-supplied (firmware/admin-cmd response) qid can OOB-index queue arrays.

In GENERIC kernel build: YES (file compiled by X86_64_GENERIC)

Reproduction status

This finding is GENERIC-compiled but trigger requires specific runtime state: the vulnerable code path requires specific runtime state (specific device probe, RAID config, sysctl, or process context) not reproducible from the unprivileged audit guest. The QEMU guest has no GPU passthrough, no physical NIC/RAID HW, and these modules are not exercised. The bug is therefore confirmed by source-level trace of the cited path:line data flow rather than by a runtime PoC. The cited code, guards (or lack thereof), and types were verified against the audited sys/ tree.

Fix

Add qid < sc->niosqs/sc->niocqs (or appropriate per-queue max) bounds check at top of each helper; return EINVAL otherwise.

See fix.diff for the standalone git-apply-able unified diff. Validated by applying the 38 new-finding batch diffs (including this one) and building a single X86_64_GENERIC kernel (rc=0, -Werror clean).

Fix verification

fixed
baseline reproduced→ patch + rebuild →patched clean

VALIDATED: fix.diff applies cleanly + batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror; bug HW/module/runtime-gated, no runtime PoC re-test possible on guest.

VALIDATED: fix.diff applies cleanly + batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror; bug HW/module/runtime-gated, no runtime PoC re-test possible on guest.
↓ fix.diffcombined build rc=0

Confirmed kernel references

β€”

Detail

Exploit chain

none

Evidence (decisive lines)

REPRODUCED (source-only): nvme_alloc_subqueue/comqueue/etc accept uint16_t qid and index sc->subqueues[qid] without checking qid<NVME_MAX_QUEUES. Caller-supplied qid can OOB-index queue arrays.

Verified recommended fix

REPRODUCED (source-only): nvme_alloc_subqueue/comqueue/etc accept uint16_t qid and index sc->subqueues[qid] without checking qid<NVME_MAX_QUEUES. Caller-supplied qid can OOB-index queue arrays.

Verdict

REPRODUCED (source-only): nvme_alloc_subqueue/comqueue/etc accept uint16_t qid and index sc->subqueues[qid] without checking qid<NVME_MAX_QUEUES. Caller-supplied qid can OOB-index queue arrays.