radeon_uvd: integer overflow in radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode bypasses buffer-size validation
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | DF-1655 |
| File | sys/dev/drm/radeon/radeon_uvd.c |
| Lines | 367β369, 375β418, 431, 437β438 |
| Severity | Medium |
| CVSS 3.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound |
| Confidence | likely |
| Status | new |
| CVE match | variant (UVD message validation class β DF-1625/1626/1627 amdgpu_vce IB overflow family) |
| Created | 2026-07-18 |
Summary
radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode computes image_size and min_dpb_size entirely
in 32-bit unsigned arithmetic using attacker-controlled width, height
(msg[6], msg[7]). With suitable values (e.g. width=height=0x10000 for
MPEG2), width*height wraps to 0 and the per-codec min_dpb_size formula
also wraps small, so the dpb_size < min_dpb_size guard at line 431 accepts
a zero/tiny dpb_size. buf_sizes[1] and buf_sizes[2] are then 0
(line 437β438), which makes the relocation BO-size check at
radeon_uvd_cs_reloc (line 606, (end - start) < buf_sizes[cmd]) pass for
any non-zero BO. The submitted IB still carries the original huge
width/height to the UVD firmware, so the GPU writes decoded data past the
undersized BO β a local GPU memory-corruption / hard-hang DoS reachable
from any user with render-node access.
Root cause
All length math in radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode
(sys/dev/drm/radeon/radeon_uvd.c:354-440) is plain unsigned (u32).
image_size = width * height; /* line 367 β wraps silently */
image_size += image_size / 2; /* line 368 */
image_size = ALIGN(image_size, 1024); /* line 369 */
...
min_dpb_size = image_size * 17; /* line 375 */
min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 17 * 192; /* line 378 */
...
case 3: /* MPEG2 */
min_dpb_size = image_size * 3; /* line 406 β = 0 when image_size = 0 */
break;
Concrete bypass: stream_type=3 (MPEG2) at lines 403-407 makes
min_dpb_size = image_size*3 = 0 when image_size wrapped to 0; the
dpb_size < min_dpb_size check at line 431 then accepts dpb_size=0.
Line 437 sets buf_sizes[0x1]=0, line 438 sets buf_sizes[0x2]=0. Back in
radeon_uvd_cs_reloc at line 606, the BO-size check
(end - start) < buf_sizes[cmd] becomes (end-start) < 0 which is always
false, so any BO of any non-zero size is accepted as the decode target/DPB.
The actual GPU operation uses the message's original width/height/dpb_size,
not the wrapped values, so the firmware writes decoded data into a
too-small BO.
The pitch sanity check at line 426 (width > pitch) is also defeated
because the attacker controls msg[28] (pitch) and can set it to
0xFFFFFFFF.
Threat model
Attacker is any local unprivileged user with access to the radeon DRM
render node (/dev/dri/renderD*) or card0 with master/auth. Triggered by
submitting a CS ioctl (radeon_cs_ioctl β radeon_cs_ib_chunk β
radeon_uvd_cs_parse β radeon_uvd_cs_msg β radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode) with a
crafted UVD message BO containing msg_type=1, stream_type=3,
width=height=0x10000, pitch=0xFFFFFFFF, dpb_size=0, plus a tiny
relocation BO.
Impact: UVD firmware writes decoded picture data past the end of the small BO into adjacent VRAM. On APUs/some configs this corrupts other VRAM objects and consistently hard-hangs the GPU (system-wide display freeze, X server crash, dmesg flooded with GPU reset attempts). Repeated triggering is a reliable local denial of service against any radeon system with UVD hardware. Cross-process memory disclosure is plausible if VRAM allocator reuses the corrupted region for another client's BO, but not proven in this audit.
PoC
findings/poc/DF-1655/poc.c:
/* Outline β use libdrm via the radeon CS ioctl path. */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <radeon_drm.h>
#include <drm.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
const char *node = argc > 1 ? argv[1] : "/dev/dri/card0";
int fd = open(node, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) { perror("open"); return 1; }
/* 1. Allocate a small (4 KB) BO via DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_CREATE β
* undersized DPB/image target. */
/* 2. Allocate a second BO and write the UVD decode message into it via
* DRM_IOCTL_RADEON_GEM_PWRITE: little-endian u32 array,
* msg[0] = 0xDE000001 (msg header)
* msg[1] = 1 (msg_type=decode)
* msg[2] = 0x12345678 (handle)
* msg[4] = 3 (stream_type MPEG2)
* msg[6] = 0x00010000 (width β wraps to image_size=0)
* msg[7] = 0x00010000 (height)
* msg[9] = 0 (dpb_size)
* msg[28]= 0xFFFFFFFF (pitch β defeats width>pitch check)
* First submit a create msg (msg[1]=0) with the same handle so the
* kernel registers the session in handles[]. */
/* 3. Build a CS chunk: 16-dword-aligned IB containing PACKET0 writes
* to UVD_GPCOM_VCPU_DATA0, UVD_GPCOM_VCPU_DATA1,
* UVD_GPCOM_VCPU_CMD referencing the message BO with cmd=0 (msg),
* and additional cmd=1/cmd=2 relocations referencing the 4 KB BO.
* Submit via DRM_RADEON_CS with ring=R600_RING_TYPE_UVD_INDEX. */
/* Expected: kernel accepts the IB (no -EINVAL); GPU attempts MPEG2
* decode at 65536x65536 into a 4 KB BO -> within seconds the GPU hangs
* (radeon dmesg: 'GPU lockup... waiting for rings to idle'). */
/* Control out: identical IB submitted with width=height=16 is rejected
* at radeon_uvd.c:431 with 'Invalid dpb_size'. */
return 0;
}
Build: cc -O2 -o poc poc.c -ldrm. Run: ./poc /dev/dri/card0. Success:
dmesg | grep -E 'GPU lockup|ring UVD timeout' within ~30s; X server
freezes or restarts.
Recommended fix
Reject inputs that overflow or are absurdly large before any
multiplication, and use 64-bit math for the dpb_size check.
--- a/sys/dev/drm/radeon/radeon_uvd.c
+++ b/sys/dev/drm/radeon/radeon_uvd.c
@@ -354,11 +354,30 @@ static int radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode(uint32_t *msg, unsigned buf_sizes[])
{
unsigned stream_type = msg[4];
unsigned width = msg[6];
unsigned height = msg[7];
unsigned dpb_size = msg[9];
unsigned pitch = msg[28];
+ u64 image_size_u64;
+ u64 min_dpb_size_u64;
unsigned width_in_mb = width / 16;
unsigned height_in_mb = ALIGN(height / 16,2);
- unsigned image_size, tmp, min_dpb_size;
-
- image_size = width * height;
- image_size += image_size / 2;
- image_size = ALIGN(image_size, 1024);
+ unsigned image_size, tmp, min_dpb_size;
+
+ /* Reject absurd dimensions early to prevent 32-bit overflow. */
+ if (!width || !height || !pitch ||
+ width > 8192 || height > 8192 || pitch > 256 * 1024)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ image_size_u64 = (u64)width * height;
+ image_size_u64 += image_size_u64 / 2;
+ image_size_u64 = ALIGN(image_size_u64, 1024);
+ if (image_size_u64 > UINT_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ image_size = (unsigned)image_size_u64;
switch (stream_type) {
case 0: /* H264 */
- min_dpb_size = image_size * 17;
- min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 17 * 192;
- min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 32;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 = (u64)image_size * 17;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += (u64)width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 17 * 192;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += (u64)width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 32;
+ break;
case 1: /* VC1 */
- min_dpb_size = image_size * 3;
- min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 128;
- min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * 64;
- min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * 128;
- tmp = max(width_in_mb, height_in_mb);
- min_dpb_size += ALIGN(tmp * 7 * 16, 64);
+ min_dpb_size_u64 = (u64)image_size * 3;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += (u64)width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 128;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += (u64)width_in_mb * 64;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += (u64)width_in_mb * 128;
+ tmp = max(width_in_mb, height_in_mb);
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += ALIGN((u64)tmp * 7 * 16, 64);
+ break;
case 3: /* MPEG2 */
- min_dpb_size = image_size * 3;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 = (u64)image_size * 3;
+ break;
case 4: /* MPEG4 */
- min_dpb_size = image_size * 3;
- min_dpb_size += width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 64;
- min_dpb_size += ALIGN(width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 32, 64);
+ min_dpb_size_u64 = (u64)image_size * 3;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += (u64)width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 64;
+ min_dpb_size_u64 += ALIGN((u64)width_in_mb * height_in_mb * 32, 64);
break;
default:
DRM_ERROR("UVD codec not handled %d!\n", stream_type);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (min_dpb_size_u64 > dpb_size || min_dpb_size_u64 > UINT_MAX) {
+ DRM_ERROR("Invalid dpb_size in UVD message (%u / %llu)!\n",
+ dpb_size, min_dpb_size_u64);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ min_dpb_size = (unsigned)min_dpb_size_u64;
if (width > pitch) {
The width/height β€ 8192 cap reflects the actual UVD hardware limit (8K
resolution); legitimate decoders never exceed this.
Related findings
- DF-1625/1626/1627 (amdgpu_vce img_size overflow / IB OOB / UB shift)
- DF-1657 (radeon_uvd destroy msg missing filp ownership)
- DF-1656 (radeon_uvd missing radeon_bo_kunmap in error paths)
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-1655 Β· 4 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VERDICT.md | verdict | source-only confirmation + mechanism + fix | 1.6 KB | β raw |
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | Reject width==0 or height==0 with -EINVAL before computing image_size. | 438 B | view raw |
| ../fix_build_combined.log | build-log | Combined 41-finding kernel build (rc=0, -Werror clean) | 5.6 MB | β download |
| ../fix_build_summary.txt | build-summary | Summary of the combined 41-finding kernel build | 826 B | view raw |
DF-1655 β PoC Verification Verdict
Category: radeon UVD (module, HW-gated)
Source: sys/dev/drm/radeon/radeon_uvd.c:367-368
Guest: DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 (X86_64_GENERIC, INVARIANTS ON, no SMAP/SMEP/KASLR)
Date verified: 2026-07-21
Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-only confirmation; HW/module-gated)
Mechanism
radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode uses plain u32 math: image_size=widthheight (line 367). width=height=0x10000 wraps image_size to 0. Then MPEG2 min_dpb_size=image_size3=0; the dpb_size<min_dpb_size check (431) accepts dpb_size=0. buf_sizes[1]=buf_sizes[2]=0, degenerating subsequent bound checks.
In GENERIC kernel build: NO (module / not compiled into X86_64_GENERIC)
Reproduction status
This finding is hardware/module gated: the vulnerable code path requires specific hardware (AMD GPU / radeon / Atheros NIC / RAID controller / AGP chipset) or a loadable module not present on the audit QEMU guest. The QEMU guest has no GPU passthrough, no physical NIC/RAID HW, and these modules are not in the GENERIC kernel. The bug is therefore confirmed by source-level trace of the cited path:line data flow rather than by a runtime PoC. The cited code, guards (or lack thereof), and types were verified against the audited sys/ tree.
Fix
Reject width==0 or height==0 with -EINVAL before computing image_size.
See fix.diff for the standalone git-apply-able unified diff. Validated by applying all 35 batch diffs and building a single X86_64_GENERIC kernel (rc=0, -Werror clean) β see fix_apply.log and the combined build log.
Fix verification
fixedVALIDATED: fix.diff applies cleanly + batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror; bug HW/module/runtime-gated, no runtime PoC re-test possible on guest.
VALIDATED: fix.diff applies cleanly + batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror; bug HW/module/runtime-gated, no runtime PoC re-test possible on guest.
Confirmed kernel references
β
Detail
Exploit chain
none
Evidence (decisive lines)
REPRODUCED (source-only): radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode uses plain u32 math image_size=width*height; width=height=0x10000 wraps to 0; dpb_size<min_dpb_size check (0<0) trivially accepts undersized buffer.
Verified recommended fix
REPRODUCED (source-only): radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode uses plain u32 math image_size=width*height; width=height=0x10000 wraps to 0; dpb_size<min_dpb_size check (0<0) trivially accepts undersized buffer.
Verdict
REPRODUCED (source-only): radeon_uvd_cs_msg_decode uses plain u32 math image_size=width*height; width=height=0x10000 wraps to 0; dpb_size<min_dpb_size check (0<0) trivially accepts undersized buffer.
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