Kernel heap info leak via unbounded copyout of oversized outbuffer
- File:
sys/dev/raid/hpt27xx/hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c - Lines: 1289, 1290, 1293, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305
- Severity: Low
- CVSS:
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U:C:L/I:N/A:N - CWE: CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information
- Confidence: likely
Summary
hpt_ioctl kmallocs nOutBufferSize bytes (M_DEVBUF, no M_ZERO) for the
outbuffer and then, on success, copyout()s the full nOutBufferSize to user
space β not the count of bytes ldm actually wrote (which the OSM never learns).
A caller passing nOutBufferSize larger than the ioctl's required output size
receives the unused tail of the kmalloc'd buffer, which contains stale
M_DEVBUF heap contents (kernel pointers, file names, attacker-uncontrolled but
sensitive data).
Root cause
- Line 1290:
ioctl_args.lpOutBuffer = kmalloc(ioctl_args.nOutBufferSize, M_DEVBUF, M_WAITOK);β noM_ZEROflag, so the buffer starts out containing whatever was last freed into theM_DEVBUFslab. - The closed-source
ldm_ioctlwrites only as many bytes as eachdwIoControlCoderequires (typicallysizeof(CONTROLLER_INFO),sizeof(LOGICAL_DEVICE_INFO_V3), etc.). - Lines 1302-1305:
if (piop->nOutBufferSize) { if (copyout(ioctl_args.lpOutBuffer, (void*)piop->lpOutBuffer, piop->nOutBufferSize)) goto invalid; }copies the entire user-supplied size back, exposing the unwritten tail.
Threat
Caller is root (file mode 0600), but the leak crosses the kernel/user boundary for data the caller could not otherwise see β useful for KASLR bypass and for revealing recently-freed kernel object pointers when chained with heap-grooming primitives.
Each call leaks (nOutBufferSize - actual_size) bytes of heap.
Recommended fix
Zero the outbuffer on allocation, or copy out only the bytes ldm reports via
lpBytesReturned (falling back to nOutBufferSize only when lpBytesReturned is
unset).
--- a/sys/dev/raid/hpt27xx/hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c
+++ b/sys/dev/raid/hpt27xx/hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c
@@ -1289,7 +1289,8 @@ static int hpt_ioctl(struct dev_ioctl_args *ap)
if (ioctl_args.nOutBufferSize) {
- ioctl_args.lpOutBuffer = kmalloc(ioctl_args.nOutBufferSize, M_DEVBUF, M_WAITOK);
+ ioctl_args.lpOutBuffer = kmalloc(ioctl_args.nOutBufferSize,
+ M_DEVBUF, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
if (!ioctl_args.lpOutBuffer)
goto invalid;
}
And additionally cap the copyout to *lpBytesReturned when it is smaller than
nOutBufferSize.
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-1565 Β· 4 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able fix for the cited bug | 484 B | view raw |
| VERDICT.md | verdict | source-confirmation analysis | 720 B | β raw |
| build.sh | build-script | N/A (source-only) | 61 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run-script | N/A (source-only) | 87 B | view raw |
DF-1565 VERDICT
Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-confirmed)
Impact: Low (driver-level NULL deref / OOB / leak / DoS β hardware-gated)
Mechanism: hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c:1290 ioctl_args.lpOutBuffer = kmalloc(nOutBufferSize, M_DEVBUF, M_WAITOK) NO M_ZERO. ldm_ioctl writes only the ioctl-required bytes (sizeof(CONTROLLER_INFO) etc). 1302-1305 copyout(l
Citation: sys/dev/raid/hpt27xx/hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c:1289-1305
Fix: Applied fix.diff β compiles in batch kernel build (rc=0, -Werror).
Verification method: Source-only line-by-line trace of cited path:line. Low-severity driver bug; PoC trigger requires specific hardware or root context. Confirmed the cited vulnerable pattern exists in source.
Fix verification
fixedfix.diff compiled in batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror
fix.diff compiled in batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror
Confirmed kernel references
β
Detail
Exploit chain
none (Low severity)
Evidence (decisive lines)
Source-confirmed: kmalloc without M_ZERO + full-size copyout leaks heap (hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c:1290,1303)
Verified recommended fix
Source-confirmed: kmalloc without M_ZERO + full-size copyout leaks heap (hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c:1290,1303)
Verdict
Source-confirmed: kmalloc without M_ZERO + full-size copyout leaks heap (hpt27xx_osm_bsd.c:1290,1303)
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