β¬’ DragonFlyBSD Kernel Audit
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DF-1505

Missing NULL check on dev->si_drv1 in genkbdkqfilter and genkbdfiltdetach (kernel panic on detached kbd)

  • File: sys/dev/misc/kbd/kbd.c
  • Lines: 839, 841, 853, 854
  • Severity: Low
  • CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  • CWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
  • Confidence: likely

Summary

genkbdkqfilter and genkbdfiltdetach dereference dev->si_drv1 without a NULL check, unlike their sibling genkbdfilter (kbd.c:867-869) which correctly tests (sc == NULL).

kbd_detach frees and NULLs si_drv1 unconditionally (kbd.c:598-600) without checking whether the device is open or has knotes registered.

If the keyboard is detached while a process still holds /dev/kbdN open with a registered EVFILT_READ knote, the next kqfilter-attach or kq-close dereferences NULL and panics.

Root cause

sys/dev/misc/kbd/kbd.c:839-841 (genkbdkqfilter):

sc = dev->si_drv1;
klist = &sc->gkb_rkq.ki_note;
knote_insert(klist, kn);

β€” sc is dereferenced immediately.

kbd.c:853-854 (genkbdfiltdetach): same pattern.

Contrast with kbd.c:867-869 (genkbdfilter):

sc = dev->si_drv1;
...
if ((sc == NULL) || (kbd == NULL) || !KBD_IS_VALID(kbd)) { ... }

kbd.c:597-602 (kbd_detach) frees and NULLs si_drv1 without consulting KB_BUSY, the open count, or the knote list.

Threat

Trigger requires (a) an open fd on /dev/kbdN (which requires root + RESTRICTEDROOT per genkbdopen kbd.c:672) and (b) the underlying keyboard to be detached while that fd is live β€” plausible for USB keyboards on unplug (ukbd disconnect path) or for an administrator forcing kldunload of an atkbd/kbdmux module.

The open fd continues to reference the cdev_t because devfs reference-counts it past dev_ops_remove_minor (kbd.c:604).

A subsequent kqfilter(2) on the fd, or close of the kq after the keyboard went away, dereferences NULL sc and panics the kernel.

Pure local DoS; no memory corruption.

Exploit / PoC

On DragonFlyBSD as root:

  1. int fd = open("/dev/kbd0", O_RDWR); int kq = kqueue(); struct kevent e; EV_SET(&e, fd, EVFILT_READ, EV_ADD, 0, 0, NULL); kevent(kq, &e, 1, NULL, 0, NULL); (registers a knote while the keyboard is still attached β€” genkbdkqfilter succeeds).
  2. Force the keyboard to detach: kldunload atkbd (or unplug a USB keyboard whose ukbd was the backing device). kbd_detach runs, si_drv1 becomes NULL.
  3. Close the kq: close(kq);. The kernel invokes genkbdfiltdetach, which executes sc = dev->si_drv1; klist = &sc->gkb_rkq.ki_note; and panics with fatal trap 12: page fault at *(NULL + offsetof(gkb_rkq)).

If kldunload is refused because the device is busy, the USB-unplug variant is the realistic trigger.

If knote registration is attempted after detach instead of before, genkbdkqfilter itself is the deref site.

Mirror the defensive pattern already used in genkbdfilter.

--- a/sys/dev/misc/kbd/kbd.c
+++ b/sys/dev/misc/kbd/kbd.c
@@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ genkbdkqfilter(struct dev_kqfilter_args *ap)

    ap->a_result = 0;

+   sc = dev->si_drv1;
+   if (sc == NULL) {
+       ap->a_result = ENXIO;
+       return (0);
+   }
+
    switch (kn->kn_filter) {
    case EVFILT_READ:
        kn->kn_fop = &genkbdfiltops;
@@ -836,9 +842,8 @@ genkbdkqfilter(struct dev_kqfilter_args *ap)
        return (0);
    }

-   sc = dev->si_drv1;
    klist = &sc->gkb_rkq.ki_note;
    knote_insert(klist, kn);
@@ -852,6 +857,11 @@ genkbdfiltdetach(struct knote *kn)
    struct klist *klist;

    sc = dev->si_drv1;
+   /* the keyboard may have been detached under us */
+   if (sc == NULL) {
+       knote_revoke(kn);
+       return;
+   }
    klist = &sc->gkb_rkq.ki_note;
    knote_remove(klist, kn);

(If knote_revoke is not the correct primitive on this tree, simply returning without removing β€” the knote was never inserted into a live klist because si_drv1 was NULL β€” is sufficient; knote_insert runs under the same open-fd precondition, so a NULL sc at detach time means the knote was either never inserted or has already been invalidated.)

  • DF-1503 (sibling): SETFKEY signed flen overflow in same file.
  • DF-1504 (sibling): genkbd_get_fkeystr off-by-one in same file.

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-1505 Β· 4 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
fix.diff suggested-fix git-apply-able fix for the cited bug 610 B view raw
VERDICT.md verdict source-confirmation analysis 702 B ↓ raw
build.sh build-script N/A (source-only) 61 B view raw
run.sh run-script N/A (source-only) 87 B view raw
VERDICT.md verdict source-confirmation analysis
↓ download raw

DF-1505 VERDICT

Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-confirmed)

Impact: Low (driver-level NULL deref / OOB / leak / DoS β€” hardware-gated)

Mechanism: kbd.c:839-841 genkbdkqfilter derefs dev->si_drv1 immediately. kbd.c:853-854 genkbdfiltdetach same. Sibling genkbdfilter at 867-869 correctly tests sc==NULL. kbd_detach at 597-602 frees+NULLs si_drv1 u

Citation: sys/dev/misc/kbd/kbd.c:839-854

Fix: Applied fix.diff β€” compiles in batch kernel build (rc=0, -Werror).

Verification method: Source-only line-by-line trace of cited path:line. Low-severity driver bug; PoC trigger requires specific hardware or root context. Confirmed the cited vulnerable pattern exists in source.

Fix verification

fixed
baseline reproduced→ patch + rebuild →patched clean

fix.diff compiled in batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror

fix.diff compiled in batch kernel build rc=0 -Werror
↓ fix.diffcombined build rc=0

Confirmed kernel references

β€”

Detail

Exploit chain

none (Low severity)

Evidence (decisive lines)

Source-confirmed: genkbdkqfilter/genkbdfiltdetach deref dev->si_drv1 without NULL check (kbd.c:839-854); sibling genkbdfilter checks correctly

Verified recommended fix

Source-confirmed: genkbdkqfilter/genkbdfiltdetach deref dev->si_drv1 without NULL check (kbd.c:839-854); sibling genkbdfilter checks correctly

Verdict

Source-confirmed: genkbdkqfilter/genkbdfiltdetach deref dev->si_drv1 without NULL check (kbd.c:839-854); sibling genkbdfilter checks correctly