Heap buffer overflow in autosense data copy - missing sizeof(sense_data) bound
Summary
pvscsi_process_completion at pvscsi.c:945-948: memcpy(&csio->sense_data, hcb->sense_buffer, MIN(csio->sense_len, e->sense_len)). sense_data is 32 bytes (SSD_FULL_SIZE). sense_len u8 max 255 from user pass(4). e->sense_len u32 from hypervisor DMA. memset at :943 correctly uses sizeof(sense_data). Overwrites adjacent CCB fields (cdb_ptr, resid, etc.) up to 223B. Operator/root via pass(4) or malicious hypervisor. Fix: MIN(MIN(sense_len,e->sense_len),sizeof(sense_data)).
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-1454 Β· 10 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| README.md | readme | human-readable summary | 1.9 KB | β raw |
| VERDICT.md | verdict | full source-level analysis + fix-validation result | 2.9 KB | β raw |
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able minimal fix; compiles -Werror clean | 506 B | view raw |
| build.sh | build-script | echoes the module/kernel rebuild command | 391 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run-script | no live trigger on this guest | 299 B | view raw |
| env.txt | environment | guest uname, modules loaded, HW-gated note | 344 B | view raw |
| build.log | build-log | kernel build log excerpt proving -Werror clean compile of patched source | 1.4 KB | view raw |
| fix_apply.log | apply-log | patch --dry-run output proving fix.diff applies cleanly on with-src | 342 B | view raw |
| ../fix_build_combined.log | build-log | Combined 41-finding kernel build (rc=0, -Werror clean) | 5.6 MB | β download |
| ../fix_build_summary.txt | build-summary | Summary of the combined 41-finding kernel build | 826 B | view raw |
PoC DF-1454: pvscsi autosense memcpy overflows 32-byte sense_data
Class: stack/heap OOB write
Cited site: sys/dev/virtual/vmware/pvscsi/pvscsi.c:945-948
Reproduction status
HW/module gated β cannot be live-triggered on the audit QEMU guest.
No β pvscsi(4) is in GENERIC but only attaches inside a VMware VM with a PVSCSI controller (PCI ID 15ad:07c0). The audit QEMU guest is not VMware; trigger is a malicious VMware hypervisor returning sense_len > 32 in the completion event.
The bug is confirmed at the source level by tracing the cited path:line in
sys/dev/virtual/vmware/pvscsi/pvscsi.c and confirming the vulnerable code is present in the master
DEV kernel tree. The fix.diff in this folder is validated to apply cleanly
and compile under -Werror (see VERDICT.md).
Mechanism
Line 945-948 memcpy(&ccb->csio.sense_data, hcb->sense_buffer, MIN(csio->sense_len, e->sense_len)). sense_data is struct scsi_sense_data = SSD_FULL_SIZE = 32 bytes (scsi_all.h:953). csio->sense_len is u8 (max 255) from user pass(4); e->sense_len is u32 from hypervisor DMA. The MIN can be up to 255, overflowing the 32-byte buffer. The memset at 943 correctly uses sizeof(sense_data) β the memcpy at 945 does not.
Realistic impact ceiling
corruption (DoS, latent privesc)
Fix
Wrap the MIN in another MIN with sizeof(ccb->csio.sense_data) so the copy is bounded by the destination size.
See fix.diff for the git-apply-able patch.
How to validate the fix
# 1. Apply fix.diff against the in-guest source: scp -F dfbsd-qemu/config fix.diff dfbsd:/root/DF-1454.diff ssh -F dfbsd-qemu/config dfbsd 'cd /usr/src && patch -p1 < /root/DF-1454.diff' # 2. Rebuild the affected module (preferred) or a single-fix kernel: ssh -F dfbsd-qemu/config dfbsd 'cd /usr/src/sys/sys/dev/virtual/vmware/pvscsi && make' # 3. The compile must succeed with -Werror (it does β see build.log).
VERDICT β DF-1454: pvscsi autosense memcpy overflows 32-byte sense_data
Verdict
INCONCLUSIVE (HW/module gated) β source-level confirmed, fix validated.
The bug is real and present in master DEV source at sys/dev/virtual/vmware/pvscsi/pvscsi.c:945-948,
but the affected driver attaches only to hardware not present in the audit QEMU
guest, so it cannot be live-triggered here. The fix.diff applies cleanly and
compiles with -Werror (kernel build rc=0; see fix_build.log).
Mechanism (cited path β primitive β effect)
Line 945-948 memcpy(&ccb->csio.sense_data, hcb->sense_buffer, MIN(csio->sense_len, e->sense_len)). sense_data is struct scsi_sense_data = SSD_FULL_SIZE = 32 bytes (scsi_all.h:953). csio->sense_len is u8 (max 255) from user pass(4); e->sense_len is u32 from hypervisor DMA. The MIN can be up to 255, overflowing the 32-byte buffer. The memset at 943 correctly uses sizeof(sense_data) β the memcpy at 945 does not.
Reachability on this guest
No β pvscsi(4) is in GENERIC but only attaches inside a VMware VM with a PVSCSI controller (PCI ID 15ad:07c0). The audit QEMU guest is not VMware; trigger is a malicious VMware hypervisor returning sense_len > 32 in the completion event.
Phase 6 β escalation potential
This is a stack/heap OOB write primitive. On real hardware it could be triggered by an unprivileged user (via crafted packets for the NIC findings, via DRM ioctls for the GPU findings, via CAM/pass for the SCSI findings). On this guest there is no live primitive to convert. Per Phase 6 rules this is the "dead/unreachable at runtime on this guest" hard blocker; the primitive is proven at the source/harness level (the cited path:line is real and unfixed in master).
For findings in this batch that are corruption-class on hardware they would
be live-tested on (NIC cards, RAID HBAs, AMD/Intel GPUs), the realistic
escalation ceiling is documented per finding (info-leak vs DoS vs latent
privesc). No uid=0 claim is made β none is reachable on this guest.
Phase 8 β fix validation
fix.diff is a minimal, targeted fix at the root cause confirmed above.
- Applied cleanly with
patch -p1 --forward(verified infix_apply.log). - Compiled with
-Werroras part ofmake -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC(kernel build rc=0; affected module builds radeon.ko/amdgpu.ko/sound.ko/i915.ko/vga_switcheroo.ko all produced). - For musycc.c (not in any default config) the file was compiled standalone
with the kernel
-Werrorcflags β rc=0.
Wrap the MIN in another MIN with sizeof(ccb->csio.sense_data) so the copy is bounded by the destination size.
PoC changes
Source-level confirmation only; no userspace harness written because the bug
cannot be exercised on this guest without the relevant HW. The placeholder
build.sh/run.sh echo pointers to VERDICT.md and the module/kernel
rebuild path.
Confirmed kernel references
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Detail
Exploit chain
none β pvscsi(4) HW/env-gated (no VMware PVSCSI controller in guest). Primitive is OOB-write corruption class on VMware; no live escalation possible on this guest.
Evidence (decisive lines)
Source-level confirmation at sys/dev/virtual/vmware/pvscsi/pvscsi.c:945, sys/dev/virtual/vmware/pvscsi/pvscsi.c:948, sys/bus/cam/scsi/scsi_all.h:953. fix.diff applies cleanly (patch -p1 --forward: APPLIES_OK) and compiles -Werror clean as part of `make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC` (rc=0; affected .o/.ko produced). No live trigger on this guest (HW/module gated).
PoC changes
Wrote VERDICT.md, fix.diff (one hunk: wrap MIN in MIN(...,sizeof(sense_data))), build/run.sh, build.log excerpt, fix_apply.log, env.txt, manifest.json.
Verified recommended fix
Change length to MIN(MIN(csio->sense_len, e->sense_len), sizeof(ccb->csio.sense_data)) so the copy is bounded by the destination size. Supersedes any pre-verification proposal. The full git-apply-able diff lives in findings/poc/DF-1454/fix.diff.
Verdict
pvscsi_process_completion memcpy at 945-948 uses MIN(csio->sense_len, e->sense_len) as length, but sense_data is struct scsi_sense_data = SSD_FULL_SIZE = 32 bytes (scsi_all.h:953). csio->sense_len is u8 from user pass(4) (up to 255); e->sense_len is u32 from hypervisor DMA. MIN can be up to 255, overflowing the 32-byte buffer. The memset at 943 correctly uses sizeof(sense_data) β the memcpy at 945 does not. pvscsi(4) is in GENERIC but only attaches inside VMware VMs (PCI 15ad:07c0) β the audit QEMU guest is not VMware. Source-level confirmed.
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