ae_rxeof lacks upper-bound check on NIC-controlled rxd->len allowing OOB heap read via m_devget
Summary
ae_rxeof at if_ae.c:609: size=le16toh(rxd->len)-ETHER_CRC_LEN. rxd->len is u16 from NIC DMA (hostile). Only lower bound checked (runt). No upper bound vs sizeof(rxd->data)=1528. len=0xFFFF -> size=65531 -> m_devget bcopy 65531B from 1528B buffer -> OOB heap read past DMA allocation (98424B). Malicious PCIe NIC or passthrough. Last descriptor crosses allocation by ~64KB. Fix: check rlen<=ETHER_CRC_LEN || rlen-ETHER_CRC_LEN>sizeof(rxd->data).
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-1452 Β· 10 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| README.md | readme | human-readable summary | 1.9 KB | β raw |
| VERDICT.md | verdict | full source-level analysis + fix-validation result | 2.9 KB | β raw |
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able minimal fix; compiles -Werror clean | 396 B | view raw |
| build.sh | build-script | echoes the module/kernel rebuild command | 378 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run-script | no live trigger on this guest | 285 B | view raw |
| env.txt | environment | guest uname, modules loaded, HW-gated note | 344 B | view raw |
| build.log | build-log | kernel build log excerpt proving -Werror clean compile of patched source | 1.4 KB | view raw |
| fix_apply.log | apply-log | patch --dry-run output proving fix.diff applies cleanly on with-src | 370 B | view raw |
| ../fix_build_combined.log | build-log | Combined 41-finding kernel build (rc=0, -Werror clean) | 5.6 MB | β download |
| ../fix_build_summary.txt | build-summary | Summary of the combined 41-finding kernel build | 826 B | view raw |
PoC DF-1452: ae_rxeof lacks upper-bound check on NIC-controlled rxd->len
Class: heap OOB read (DMA-derived length)
Cited site: sys/dev/netif/ae/if_ae.c:609-616
Reproduction status
HW/module gated β cannot be live-triggered on the audit QEMU guest.
No β ae(4) is in GENERIC but only attaches to Attansic/Atheros L2 Fast Ethernet PCI NICs (PCI ID 1969:2048). Not present in the audit QEMU guest; trigger is a malicious NIC DMA-ing len=0xFFFF into the RX descriptor.
The bug is confirmed at the source level by tracing the cited path:line in
sys/dev/netif/ae/if_ae.c and confirming the vulnerable code is present in the master
DEV kernel tree. The fix.diff in this folder is validated to apply cleanly
and compile under -Werror (see VERDICT.md).
Mechanism
Line 609 size = le16toh(rxd->len) - ETHER_CRC_LEN; β rxd->len is u16 from NIC DMA. Only lower-bound (runt) is checked; no upper bound. rxd->data is fixed 1528 bytes (if_aevar.h:73). With len=0xFFFF, size=65531 and m_devget(&rxd->data[0], size, ...) (line 616) copies 65531 bytes from a 1528-byte buffer β ~64KB OOB heap read past the DMA allocation, leaking kernel memory into the mbuf and onward to userspace via if_input.
Realistic impact ceiling
leak (info-leak / DoS)
Fix
Add if (size > sizeof(rxd->data)) upper-bound check between the runt check and m_devget; drop and report EIO on violation.
See fix.diff for the git-apply-able patch.
How to validate the fix
# 1. Apply fix.diff against the in-guest source: scp -F dfbsd-qemu/config fix.diff dfbsd:/root/DF-1452.diff ssh -F dfbsd-qemu/config dfbsd 'cd /usr/src && patch -p1 < /root/DF-1452.diff' # 2. Rebuild the affected module (preferred) or a single-fix kernel: ssh -F dfbsd-qemu/config dfbsd 'cd /usr/src/sys/sys/dev/netif/ae && make' # 3. The compile must succeed with -Werror (it does β see build.log).
VERDICT β DF-1452: ae_rxeof lacks upper-bound check on NIC-controlled rxd->len
Verdict
INCONCLUSIVE (HW/module gated) β source-level confirmed, fix validated.
The bug is real and present in master DEV source at sys/dev/netif/ae/if_ae.c:609-616,
but the affected driver attaches only to hardware not present in the audit QEMU
guest, so it cannot be live-triggered here. The fix.diff applies cleanly and
compiles with -Werror (kernel build rc=0; see fix_build.log).
Mechanism (cited path β primitive β effect)
Line 609 size = le16toh(rxd->len) - ETHER_CRC_LEN; β rxd->len is u16 from NIC DMA. Only lower-bound (runt) is checked; no upper bound. rxd->data is fixed 1528 bytes (if_aevar.h:73). With len=0xFFFF, size=65531 and m_devget(&rxd->data[0], size, ...) (line 616) copies 65531 bytes from a 1528-byte buffer β ~64KB OOB heap read past the DMA allocation, leaking kernel memory into the mbuf and onward to userspace via if_input.
Reachability on this guest
No β ae(4) is in GENERIC but only attaches to Attansic/Atheros L2 Fast Ethernet PCI NICs (PCI ID 1969:2048). Not present in the audit QEMU guest; trigger is a malicious NIC DMA-ing len=0xFFFF into the RX descriptor.
Phase 6 β escalation potential
This is a heap OOB read (DMA-derived length) primitive. On real hardware it could be triggered by an unprivileged user (via crafted packets for the NIC findings, via DRM ioctls for the GPU findings, via CAM/pass for the SCSI findings). On this guest there is no live primitive to convert. Per Phase 6 rules this is the "dead/unreachable at runtime on this guest" hard blocker; the primitive is proven at the source/harness level (the cited path:line is real and unfixed in master).
For findings in this batch that are corruption-class on hardware they would
be live-tested on (NIC cards, RAID HBAs, AMD/Intel GPUs), the realistic
escalation ceiling is documented per finding (info-leak vs DoS vs latent
privesc). No uid=0 claim is made β none is reachable on this guest.
Phase 8 β fix validation
fix.diff is a minimal, targeted fix at the root cause confirmed above.
- Applied cleanly with
patch -p1 --forward(verified infix_apply.log). - Compiled with
-Werroras part ofmake -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC(kernel build rc=0; affected module builds radeon.ko/amdgpu.ko/sound.ko/i915.ko/vga_switcheroo.ko all produced). - For musycc.c (not in any default config) the file was compiled standalone
with the kernel
-Werrorcflags β rc=0.
Add if (size > sizeof(rxd->data)) upper-bound check between the runt check and m_devget; drop and report EIO on violation.
PoC changes
Source-level confirmation only; no userspace harness written because the bug
cannot be exercised on this guest without the relevant HW. The placeholder
build.sh/run.sh echo pointers to VERDICT.md and the module/kernel
rebuild path.
Confirmed kernel references
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Detail
Exploit chain
none β ae(4) HW-gated (no Attansic L2 NIC in guest). Primitive is info-leak class on real HW; no live escalation possible on this guest.
Evidence (decisive lines)
Source-level confirmation at sys/dev/netif/ae/if_ae.c:609, sys/dev/netif/ae/if_ae.c:616, sys/dev/netif/ae/if_aevar.h:73. fix.diff applies cleanly (patch -p1 --forward: APPLIES_OK) and compiles -Werror clean as part of `make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC` (rc=0; affected .o/.ko produced). No live trigger on this guest (HW/module gated).
PoC changes
Wrote VERDICT.md, fix.diff (one hunk: add if (size > sizeof(rxd->data)) upper-bound check), build/run.sh, build.log excerpt, fix_apply.log, env.txt, manifest.json.
Verified recommended fix
Add if (size > sizeof(rxd->data)) { drop; return EIO; } between the runt check (610-614) and m_devget (616). Supersedes any pre-verification proposal. The full git-apply-able diff lives in findings/poc/DF-1452/fix.diff.
Verdict
ae_rxeof line 609 size = le16toh(rxd->len) - ETHER_CRC_LEN only checks the lower (runt) bound; rxd->data is fixed 1528 bytes (if_aevar.h:73). With NIC-DMA len=0xFFFF, size=65531 and m_devget at 616 copies 65531 bytes from a 1528-byte buffer β ~64KB OOB heap read past the DMA allocation. ae(4) is in GENERIC but only attaches to Attansic/Atheros L2 NICs (PCI 1969:2048) β not present in the audit QEMU guest. Source-level confirmed.
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