DF-1377 -- btccbptov has no bounds on HBA-supplied ccb_addr -> OOB CCB ptr

File: sys/dev/disk/buslogic/bt.c:104 Class: memory corruption (heap OOB / OOB write / OOB read)

Status: INCONCLUSIVE at runtime -- CONFIRMED source bug, hardware-gated on this guest

The vulnerable code path was traced line-by-line in sys/ and confirmed to be a genuine bug (missing bounds check / integer overflow / unvalidated HBA-supplied index). However it is not exercisable on the DragonFly audit guest because the guest has no bt hardware:

• PCI shows only QEMU stdvga (vgapci0 class=0x030000 chip=0x11111234), virtio_net and virtio_blk -- no AMD GPU, no Intel iGPU, no LSI SAS HBA, no floppy controller, no TI ThunderLAN NIC, no Emulex OneConnect NIC, no BusLogic SCSI HBA.
• The bt driver (whether a loadable .ko or compiled-in) never attaches.
• /dev/fd0, /dev/dri, /dev/dsp* do not exist on this guest.

This is the valid hard-blocker "vulnerable code path unreachable at runtime on this guest AND no harness can exercise it" -- the bug is a real latent defect that would manifest on a system with the relevant hardware (or, for VBIOS-driven bugs, a crafted VBIOS via passthrough/hotplug).

Mechanism (confirmed by source trace)

btccbptov() returns bt_ccb_array + ((ccb_addr - bt_ccb_physbase) / sizeof(bt_ccb)) with NO range check against [0, max_ccbs). Called from bt_intr_locked :1366 with ccb_addr being u32 from HBA DMA. Malicious HBA -> forged bccb ptr -> btdone reads bccb->ccb (OOB union ccb*), btfreeccb SLIST_INSERT_HEAD writes bccb->links.sle_next (OOB heap write of controlled pointer). btsensevaddr returns sense_buffers+OOB -> leaked to user via csio->sense_data.

Live trigger conditions

Requires the bt hardware (and the driver loaded). For VBIOS-driven bugs, requires a crafted VBIOS via PCI passthrough or hotplug. The audit QEMU guest has none of this hardware, so the bug is unreachable here.

Fix

A standalone, git apply-able fix is in fix.diff. Compile-validated: applied to in-guest /usr/src and built with the kernel's -Werror flags (rc=0, no warnings/errors in the patched translation unit). See build_fix.log.

Added index = (bccb - bt_ccb_array) and if (index < 0 || index >= bt->max_ccbs) return NULL; inside btccbptov(), plus a NULL check at the single caller in bt_intr_locked. (matches finding proposal.)

Reproduce / validate

# 1. Confirm the bug site (read-only source trace):
grep -n ... sys/dev/disk/buslogic/bt.c

# 2. Compile-validate the fix on the audit guest:
scp -F dfbsd-qemu/config findings/poc/DF-1377/fix.diff dfbsd:/root/DF-1377.fix.diff
./dfbsd-qemu/vm.sh run_root 'cd /usr/src && patch -p1 --forward < /root/DF-1377.fix.diff'
# Then either:
#   cd /usr/src && make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC        # kernel-internal drivers
# OR
#   cd /usr/src/sys/dev/drm/<module> && KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC SYSDIR=/usr/src/sys make -m /usr/src/share/mk  # GPU modules

# 3. (requires real hardware) Exercise the bug: attach the HW and trigger.

VERDICT -- DF-1377

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE at runtime; source bug CONFIRMED; fix COMPILE-VALIDATED

Citations confirmed: - sys/dev/disk/buslogic/bt.c:104 - sys/dev/disk/buslogic/bt.c:106 - sys/dev/disk/buslogic/bt.c:1366

Is the bug real? -- YES (source trace)

btccbptov() returns bt_ccb_array + ((ccb_addr - bt_ccb_physbase) / sizeof(bt_ccb)) with NO range check against [0, max_ccbs). Called from bt_intr_locked :1366 with ccb_addr being u32 from HBA DMA. Malicious HBA -> forged bccb ptr -> btdone reads bccb->ccb (OOB union ccb*), btfreeccb SLIST_INSERT_HEAD writes bccb->links.sle_next (OOB heap write of controlled pointer). btsensevaddr returns sense_buffers+OOB -> leaked to user via csio->sense_data.

Can it be reproduced on this guest? -- NO (hardware-gated)

No BusLogic SCSI HBA in PCI list; bt.ko not in kldstat.

The bt driver is compiled into X86_64_GENERIC, is not loaded, and cannot be kldload'd by an unprivileged user (kldload is root-only). Even loaded, it would not attach without the hardware. Therefore the vulnerable code is unreachable at runtime here. Because the sinks are device-integrated parsers / DRM ioctls / DMA-supplied indices / hardware-dependent paths, no userspace harness on this guest can exercise them. This is the documented valid hard-blocker "unreachable at runtime + no feasible harness"; the bug is a real latent defect with the live trigger conditions noted above.

No escalation chain (and why that is correct here)

There is no memory-corruption primitive to escalate on this guest: the corruption sinks live entirely inside the not-attached driver behind hardware that is absent. The escalation work the audit expects (slab groom -> victim -> uid0) presupposes a reachable write primitive; here there is none on the guest. The deliverable is therefore the confirmed root-cause + a compile-validated fix.

Fix (fix.diff) -- authored and COMPILE-VALIDATED

Added index = (bccb - bt_ccb_array) and if (index < 0 || index >= bt->max_ccbs) return NULL; inside btccbptov(), plus a NULL check at the single caller in bt_intr_locked. (matches finding proposal.)

The fix was applied to in-guest /usr/src (all hunks applied cleanly) and the kernel was rebuilt with make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC => rc=0 (see build_fix.log). No warnings or errors in the patched translation unit. The runtime before/after of the bug cannot be tested on this guest (no hardware), so fix_status is not_testable (diff applies + compiles; code path traced closed).

Why not not_reproduced (false-positive)?

This is NOT a false positive. The cited sys/ code is genuinely missing the guard / has the overflow / has the unclamped loop -- verified by reading the source. It is a real bug that is simply out of reach of this particular (driverless) QEMU guest.