r600_dma_cs_parse reads/writes IB past length_dw (heap OOB via DMA packet at IB end)
Summary
r600_dma_cs_parse at r600_cs.c:2389: only checks p->idx<length_dw for header. DMA_PACKET_WRITE non-tiled: reads ib[idx+2] (:2415) and writes ib[idx+2] (:2418) without checking idx+2<length_dw. DMA_PACKET_COPY tiled: up to ib[idx+6] (:2439-2458). ib allocated exactly length_dw*4 bytes. OOB read (info leak) and OOB write (corruption of adjacent SA-BO). Unlike gfx path which uses radeon_cs_packet_parse (strict count+1+idx>=length_dw check). Sibling of DF-1246 (evergreen_dma_cs_parse identical). DRM_AUTH local user. Fix: validate packet body size before any indexed access.
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-1342 Β· 9 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able fix; compile-validated under -Werror in the radeon module | 1.5 KB | view raw |
| VERDICT.md | verdict | full source trace + reachability analysis + compile-validation | 3.7 KB | β raw |
| README.md | readme | summary, mechanism, trigger conditions, fix | 3.4 KB | β raw |
| build.sh | build | module build that validated the fix compiles | 368 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run | guest reachability probe | 651 B | view raw |
| build_fix.log | build-log | full radeon module build output (rc=0, -Werror) | 3.6 KB | view raw |
| env.txt | environment | uname, cc, PCI/kldstat/device-node state proving no GPU/audio | 487 B | view raw |
| ../fix_build_combined.log | build-log | Combined 41-finding kernel build (rc=0, -Werror clean) | 5.6 MB | β download |
| ../fix_build_summary.txt | build-summary | Summary of the combined 41-finding kernel build | 826 B | view raw |
DF-1342 β r600_dma_cs_parse reads/writes the IB past length_dw (DMA-packet heap OOB at IB end)
File: sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2388-2518
Class: OOB read (info leak) + OOB write (corruption) of the IB allocation
Status: INCONCLUSIVE at runtime β confirmed real source bug, hardware-gated on this guest
The vulnerable code path was traced line-by-line in sys/ and confirmed to be a genuine bug
(missing bounds check / integer overflow / UAF race). However it is not exercisable on the
DragonFly audit guest because the guest has neither an AMD GPU nor any audio controller:
- PCI shows only
vgapci0 class=0x030000(QEMU stdvga, chip0x11111234) β no AMD GPU. - No PCI audio device (class
0x0401/0x0403);hw.sndempty; no/dev/dsp. radeon.kois a loadable module only (NOT inX86_64_GENERIC), is not loaded, and cannot bekldload'd by an unprivileged user β and even if loaded would not attach without the hardware.
This is the valid hard-blocker case "vulnerable code path unreachable at runtime on this guest AND no harness can exercise it (device-integrated parser / ioctl / hardware-dependent race)." The bug is a real latent defect that would manifest on a system with the relevant hardware + the module loaded.
Mechanism (confirmed by source trace)
r600_dma_cs_parse() validates only the packet header against the IB length (p->idx >= ib_chunk->length_dw, :2389). For DMA_PACKET_WRITE non-tiled it then reads/writes ib[idx+1]/ib[idx+2] (:2415-2418); for DMA_PACKET_COPY tiled up to ib[idx+6] (:2439-2458); for CONSTANT_FILL ib[idx+1]/ib[idx+3] (:2509-2517). The IB is allocated exactly length_dw*4 bytes, so a DMA packet whose header sits at the end of the IB causes indexed accesses (and the reloc-patch writes ib[idx+N] += ...) past the allocation => OOB read (leak of adjacent SA-BO data) and OOB write (corruption). Unlike the gfx path, which uses radeon_cs_packet_parse() with a strict count+1+idx>=length_dw body check, the DMA path has no per-packet body bounds check.
Live trigger conditions
Requires an AMD Radeon R600/RV770 GPU with radeon attached and a DRM_AUTH client submitting a DMA command stream that ends mid-DMA-packet. QEMU audit guest has no AMD GPU, no /dev/dri, radeon.ko not loaded => unreachable here.
Fix
A standalone, git apply-able fix is in fix.diff. Compile-validated: applied to in-guest
/usr/src and the radeon module rebuilt under -Werror (rc=0, no warnings/errors in the
patched translation unit). See build_fix.log.
Add an idx + N >= ib_chunk->length_dw guard before the indexed accesses of each DMA packet type (WRITE: idx+2; COPY tiled: idx+6; COPY non-tiled: idx+4; CONSTANT_FILL: idx+3), returning -EINVAL on overflow, mirroring the strict body check the gfx path already has. Supersedes the finding proposal (which only said 'validate packet body size').
Reproduce / validate
# 1. Confirm the bug site exists (read-only source trace): grep -n ... sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c # 2. Validate the fix compiles (on the audit guest): scp -F dfbsd-qemu/config findings/poc/DF-1342/fix.diff dfbsd:/root/fix.diff ./dfbsd-qemu/vm.sh run_root 'cd /usr/src && patch -p1 --forward < /root/fix.diff' ./dfbsd-qemu/vm.sh run_root 'cd /usr/src/sys/dev/drm/radeon && KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC SYSDIR=/usr/src/sys make -m /usr/src/share/mk' # 3. (requires real hardware) Exercise the bug: attach an AMD GPU / audio device and trigger.
VERDICT β DF-1342
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE at runtime; source bug CONFIRMED; fix COMPILE-VALIDATED
Citations confirmed: sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2389, sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2415, sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2418, sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2439, sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2448, sys/dev/drm/radeon/r600_cs.c:2516
Is the bug real? β YES (source trace)
r600_dma_cs_parse() validates only the packet header against the IB length (p->idx >= ib_chunk->length_dw, :2389). For DMA_PACKET_WRITE non-tiled it then reads/writes ib[idx+1]/ib[idx+2] (:2415-2418); for DMA_PACKET_COPY tiled up to ib[idx+6] (:2439-2458); for CONSTANT_FILL ib[idx+1]/ib[idx+3] (:2509-2517). The IB is allocated exactly length_dw*4 bytes, so a DMA packet whose header sits at the end of the IB causes indexed accesses (and the reloc-patch writes ib[idx+N] += ...) past the allocation => OOB read (leak of adjacent SA-BO data) and OOB write (corruption). Unlike the gfx path, which uses radeon_cs_packet_parse() with a strict count+1+idx>=length_dw body check, the DMA path has no per-packet body bounds check.
Can it be reproduced on this guest? β NO (hardware-gated)
Requires an AMD Radeon R600/RV770 GPU with radeon attached and a DRM_AUTH client submitting a DMA command stream that ends mid-DMA-packet. QEMU audit guest has no AMD GPU, no /dev/dri, radeon.ko not loaded => unreachable here.
Guest evidence (env.txt): only vgapci0 class=0x030000 chip=0x11111234 (QEMU stdvga); no AMD GPU;
no PCI audio device; kldstat shows no drm/radeon/amdgpu/snd module; /dev/dri and /dev/dsp* do
not exist. The radeon module is not in X86_64_GENERIC, is not loaded, and cannot be loaded by
an unprivileged user (kldload is root-only); even loaded, it would not attach without the hardware.
Therefore the vulnerable code is unreachable at runtime here. Because the sinks are device-integrated
parsers / DRM ioctls / a hardware-dependent channel race, no userspace harness on this guest can
exercise them. This is the documented valid hard-blocker "unreachable at runtime + no feasible
harness"; the bug is a real latent defect with the live trigger conditions noted above.
No escalation chain (and why that is correct here)
There is no memory-corruption primitive to escalate on this guest: the corruption sinks live entirely
inside the not-loaded radeon driver behind hardware that is absent. The escalation work the
audit expects (slab groom -> victim -> uid0) presupposes a reachable write primitive; here there is
none on the guest. The deliverable is therefore the confirmed root-cause + a compile-validated fix.
Fix (fix.diff) β authored and COMPILE-VALIDATED
Add an idx + N >= ib_chunk->length_dw guard before the indexed accesses of each DMA packet type (WRITE: idx+2; COPY tiled: idx+6; COPY non-tiled: idx+4; CONSTANT_FILL: idx+3), returning -EINVAL on overflow, mirroring the strict body check the gfx path already has. Supersedes the finding proposal (which only said 'validate packet body size').
The fix was applied to in-guest /usr/src (all hunks applied cleanly) and the radeon module was
rebuilt with the kernel's -Werror flags:
cd /usr/src/sys/dev/...radeon... && KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC SYSDIR=/usr/src/sys make -m /usr/src/share/mk
=> rc=0, no warnings/errors in the patched translation unit (build_fix.log). The runtime
before/after of the bug cannot be tested on this guest (no hardware), so fix_status is not_testable
(diff applies + compiles; code path traced closed).
Why not not_reproduced (false-positive)?
This is NOT a false positive. The cited sys/ code is genuinely missing the guard / has the overflow
/ has the race β verified by reading the source. It is a real bug that is simply out of reach of this
particular (GPU/audio-less) QEMU guest.
Fix verification
not_testablecompile validated -Werror
module build rc=0
Confirmed kernel references
β
Detail
Exploit chain
none
Evidence (decisive lines)
β
Verdict
Source-confirmed. r600_dma_cs_parse header-only bounds check -> ib[idx+N] OOB read+write. radeon not in GENERIC.
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