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DF-0966

Raw key words me_key[4]/mo_key[4] left unzeroed on kernel stack after twofish_set_key returns

Summary

twofish_set_key at twofish.c:427 declares u_int32_t me_key[4], mo_key[4]; lines 437-438 populate from in_key (raw key material). NO explicit_bzero before return at :452. 32 bytes of raw key material remain on per-thread kernel stack. Low practical impact (kernel stack not user-readable directly; crash dump already contains ctx keys) but defense-in-depth: subsequent kernel info-leak primitive could sample same stack addresses. Fix: explicit_bzero(me_key/mo_key) before return.

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PoC verification

Evidence pack

findings/poc/DF-0966 Β· 2 files
FileTypeDescriptionSize
fix.diff suggested-fix git-apply-able fix for the cited path 464 B view raw
VERDICT.md verdict source-confirmation narrative 985 B ↓ raw
VERDICT.md verdict source-confirmation narrative
↓ download raw

DF-0966 source-confirmation

Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-confirmed)
Impact: leak Confidence: likely

Kernel ref: sys/crypto/twofish/twofish.c:452

Mechanism

raw key me_key[4]/mo_key[4] left on stack, no explicit_bzero (defense-in-depth)

Confirmation method

Source-trace confirmed the cited code path matches the finding (exact line/condition verified against sys/). Runtime PoC not exercised for this source-only Low-severity item; confirmation is by code inspection.

See fix.diff in this folder (git-apply-able unified diff).

Phase 8 (combined build)

All 64 fixes were batched into one combined patch (../_batch/combined_64.patch) and applied to in-guest /usr/src. A single make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC completed rc=0 with 0 errors under -Werror (../_batch/fix_build.log, 35374 lines). The GENERIC kernel + all modules (drm, firewire, usb, netgraph, smbfs, fuse, crypto, vm, pmap) compiled clean.

Fix verification

not_testable
baseline reproduced→ patch + rebuild →patched clean

not_testable (source-only): no runtime PoC exercised; fix.diff applies cleanly and the combined single nativekernel build of all 64 fixes completed rc=0 with 0 errors under -Werror (findings/poc/_batch/fix_build.log). Bug source-confirmed in baseline tree. Compile-validation of the fix is the requested Phase-8 deliverable for this batch.

combined build: '=== NK_DONE rc=0 ===' and '>>> Kernel build for X86_64_GENERIC completed on Thu Jul 23 09:17:55 UTC 2026' (0 'error:' lines in 35374-line log).
↓ fix.diffDragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT single-fix combined kernel (nativekernel rc=0 -Werror, 2026-07-23 09:17:55 UTC)

Confirmed kernel references

Detail

Exploit chain

none (non-corruption / source-only confirmation; no memory-corruption escalation chain developed for this Low-severity item)

Evidence (decisive lines)

source-only: raw key me_key[4]/mo_key[4] left on stack, no explicit_bzero (defense-in-depth) @ sys/crypto/twofish/twofish.c:452. Combined fix build: '=== NK_DONE rc=0 ===' / 'Kernel build for X86_64_GENERIC completed', 0 errors under -Werror (findings/poc/_batch/fix_build.log).

PoC changes

authored git-apply-able fix.diff targeting the cited line; source-trace verified the vulnerable path. Evidence pack (VERDICT.md, manifest.json, env.txt, fix.diff) in findings/poc/DF-0966/.

Verified recommended fix

explicit_bzero me_key/mo_key before return. matches finding proposal. Full diff in findings/poc/DF-0966/fix.diff.

Verdict

REPRODUCED (source-confirmed). Source-trace confirmed raw key me_key[4]/mo_key[4] left on stack, no explicit_bzero (defense-in-depth) at sys/crypto/twofish/twofish.c:452 against the audited sys/ tree; exact line/condition verified.