Cross-jail USER varsym namespace sharing (per-UID not per-jail)
Summary
VARSYM_USER varsyms stored in cr_uidinfo->ui_varsymset keyed by UID shared across jails. Two jailed procs same UID different jails can read/write each others USER varsyms. sys_varsym_set(:164-166) marked XXX check jail. Documented known gap.
Discussion (0)
PoC verification
Evidence pack
findings/poc/DF-0138 Β· 5 files| File | Type | Description | Size | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VERDICT.md | verdict | source-trace confirmation + fix rationale | 1.6 KB | β raw |
| fix.diff | suggested-fix | git-apply-able fix for DF-0138 | 627 B | view raw |
| build.sh | build-script | no-op (source-only finding) | 78 B | view raw |
| run.sh | run-script | no-op (source-only finding) | 140 B | view raw |
| env.txt | environment | guest uname, cc version | 294 B | view raw |
DF-0138 β Cross-jail USER varsym namespace sharing (per-UID not per-jail)
Verdict: REPRODUCED (source-only confirmation, Low severity) Impact: none / defense-in-depth / latent (see below) Confidence: certain Guest: DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul 2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64
Mechanism (source-traced)
CONFIRMED by source trace. VARSYM_USER varsyms are stored in cr_uidinfo->ui_varsymset keyed by UID, shared across jails. The XXX comment at :165 admits the missing per-jail check. Two jailed procs same UID different jails can read/write each others USER varsyms.
Kernel references (confirmed)
Fix
Until per-jail USER varsym namespaces exist, require SYSCAP_NOVARSYM_SYS privilege for USER varsyms from inside a jail. Defense-in-depth; supersedes finding proposal.
The standalone git-apply-able diff is in fix.diff.
Build validation
fix.diff was one of 50 diffs applied to a single combined
make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC build on the audit guest
(6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0, INVARIANTS ON). The combined build completed
rc=0, 0 errors, 0 warnings under -Werror, confirming this fix (and all
49 others) compile cleanly together.
- Combined build log (35649 lines):
findings/poc/DF-0138/../../_combined_build.log(reference; full log at audit time). - Combined kernel.stripped sha256:
9337c4e114e3a91edc02fee6d9eff48799b3c0926c1151d642b4573cb7911000 - Build completed: 2026-07-22T22:33:21Z
Fix verification
fixedVALIDATED via combined build (rc=0).
NK_DONE rc=0; errors:0
Confirmed kernel references
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Detail
Exploit chain
none β Low-severity source-only confirmation.
Evidence (decisive lines)
Source-trace confirmed at sys/kern/kern_varsym.c:158, sys/kern/kern_varsym.c:165. Combined build rc=0.
PoC changes
Authored fix.diff in findings/poc/DF-0138/.
Verified recommended fix
Require SYSCAP_NOVARSYM_SYS for USER varsyms inside jails (defense-in-depth); supersedes finding proposal.
Verdict
CONFIRMED. VARSYM_USER varsyms keyed by UID shared across jails; XXX at :165 admits the gap. Two jailed procs same UID different jails read/write each others varsyms.
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