Summary

relocate_file and link_elf_obj_reloc_local iterate attacker-supplied SHT_REL/SHT_RELA entries and dispatch each to elf_reloc/elf_reloc_local with only the section base (findbase). The relocation's r_offset (Elf64_Addr) is never validated to lie within the target section's [0, size) extent. The arch helper computes where = relocbase + r_offset and writes *where (sys/cpu/x86_64/misc/elf_machdep.c:90,108,127,164,171), so a crafted r_offset yields an out-of-bounds / wild write into kernel memory (or a page-fault panic).

Root cause

sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c:940-953 — findbase returns only the section start address (no size); ef->reltab[i] carries no size, and the per-relocation r_offset is never compared to the matching progtab[].size:

static Elf_Addr findbase(elf_file_t ef, int sec) {
    ...
    base = (Elf_Addr)ef->progtab[i].addr;   /* size available here but not returned */
    ...
}
...
base = findbase(ef, ef->reltab[i].sec);     /* :975 -- base only, no size */
...
elf_reloc(... rel ...);                      /* r_offset unchecked */

elf_machdep.c:90: where = (Elf_Addr *)(relocbase + rel->r_offset); then :127/:164/:171: *where = val;.

Threat model & preconditions

• Attacker position: root via kldload(2) (SYSCAP_NOKLD, securelevel 0). Root already owns the kernel (a valid .ko's SYSINIT runs in kernel context), so this grants no new privilege — it is robustness/defense-in- depth (matters for verified-boot / securelevel / restricted-module scenarios).
• Privileges gained or impact: wild write of a symbol-derived value to an attacker-chosen kernel address (state corruption / control-flow-hijack primitive), or page-fault panic (local DoS). Highest-impact class of the three link_elf_obj findings (write, not read) but root-only.
• Reachability: kldload(2) of a crafted .ko with a relocation whose r_offset is outside its target section.

Recommended fix

Have findbase return the section size too, and skip relocations whose r_offset is outside [0, size):

@@ -941
-static Elf_Addr findbase(elf_file_t ef, int sec)
+static Elf_Addr findbase(elf_file_t ef, int sec, Elf_Off *sizep)
 {
     ...
     if (sec == ef->progtab[i].sec) {
         base = (Elf_Addr)ef->progtab[i].addr;
+        if (sizep) *sizep = ef->progtab[i].size;
         break;
@@ -975
-   base = findbase(ef, ef->reltab[i].sec);
+   Elf_Off secsize = 0;
+   base = findbase(ef, ef->reltab[i].sec, &secsize);
     ...
-    for ( ; rel < rellim; rel++) {
+    for ( ; rel < rellim; rel++) {
+        if (secsize == 0 || rel->r_offset >= secsize)
+            continue;

(apply the analogous r_offset >= secsize guard in the RELA loop :1005-1020 and both link_elf_obj_reloc_local loops :1246,:1268).

References

• sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c:940-953,975-1020 — no r_offset bound.
• sys/cpu/x86_64/misc/elf_machdep.c:90,108,127,164,171 — the *where sink.
• CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write.

Timeline

• 2026-06-29 Discovered during automated file-by-file audit of sys/kern/link_elf_obj.c.
• pending Reported to DragonFlyBSD security contact.