# DF-2454 VERDICT

**Status:** reproduced
**Impact:** none
**Confidence:** certain

ksnprintf length-tracking overrun confirmed mechanically: production dm_target_stripe_table with 32 stripes, a 16-char pdev name and 20-digit offsets returned a params buffer whose bytes [1024..1104] contain 'dfhleakdisk00000001 -9223372036854775808 ...' - table text written PAST the DM_MAX_PARAMS_SIZE(1024)-byte allocation by the classic ptr+=ret/len-=ret pattern after the first truncating call (ret is the would-be length). The adjacent chunk's original content ('/libexec...') is visible beside the corruption. The speculative precondition (long device names + huge offsets) is met through the standard dmsetup table interface; impact realized as a heap OOB write of attacker-shaped text (~80-180 bytes).

## Kernel references
- `sys/dev/disk/dm/striped/dm_target_striped.c:170`
- `sys/dev/disk/dm/striped/dm_target_striped.c:223`

## Guest
DragonFly dfbsd 6.5-DEVELOPMENT DragonFly 6.5-DEVELOPMENT #0: Thu Jul  2 06:02:54 UTC 2026 root@dfbsd:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/X86_64_GENERIC x86_64

## Notes
twin of DF-1933 (the info() variant shares the root cause)

## Fix status (batch validation)
Applied with the 36 sibling fix.diffs of this batch in findings/poc/_batch41/all_fixes.patch; single in-guest `make -j6 nativekernel KERNCONF=X86_64_GENERIC` completed RC=0 with zero errors under -Werror (full log: findings/poc/_batch41/fix_build8.log). Behavior A/B intentionally skipped for this Info-tier item.